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"Verdicts in employment litigation regularly reach six and even seven
figures. The prospect of such awards does serve as a deterrent to improper
management decisions (though sometimes a source of unduly defensive
personnel practices). The overall pattern of jury awards does, however,
display a rather lottery-like response to the harm inflicted on individual
employees."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Last year, a nonpartisan federal commission headed by former Secretary
of Labor John T. Dunlop highlighted a matter of national concern when it
characterized jury responses to employees' claims of discrimination as "lottery
like." 2 The commission's finding at least partly explains the increased call for
the use of private alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in employer-employee
disputes.

1. COMI,'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGER RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

FACr FINDING REPORT, May 1994, at 110.

2. Id. In the commission's explorationof workplace productivity and conflict reduction, there
were often little or no consensus, but the Commission's views on employment-related jury
verdicts were not the subject of controversy.
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This call is often couched as a rational response to the costs, delays, and
uncertainties inherent in civil litigation,3 but the dominant motive seems to be
the search for a safe haven from runaway juries.4 Recent verdicts gaining
national publicity include an award of $7 million for sexual harassment by a
law firm partner' and $15 million for the improper sale of a $300 medicare
supplement insurance policy. 6 Publicity arising from these and other large
dollar jury awards have stimulated greater interest in ADR generally, with
particular interest in binding arbitration. As one advocate of arbitration for
employment discrimination disputes noted, "It's the existence of jury trials
which is the major impetus toward arbitration agreements." 7
ADR includes mediation, conciliation, mini-trials, non-binding arbitration,
and binding arbitration.' Of these, only binding arbitration has the same
impact as a judicial determination: a determination of liability that is
enforceable through courts of competent jurisdiction. In recent years,
employers have included predispute arbitration clauses in employment
contracts. This trend is the result of such clauses in contracts "involving
commerce" being deemed "valid, irrevocable and enforceable" under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)9 and judicial affirmance of arbitral awards."°
Moreover, the Supreme Court has opened the door to arbitration of
federal employment discrimination claims. In the 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., " the Supreme Court held that plaintiff employees
asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 12
could be compelled to arbitrate even though the employees could not have
avoided or modified the predispute arbitration clauses as a condition of

3. CaliforniaCourtApprovesBankArbitrationPlan,DISPUTE RESOLUTION TmmS, Fall 1994,
at2.
4. See generally Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, AlternativeDispute Resolution: Why
It Doesn't Work and Why It Does, HARVARD BUS. REV. 120 (May-June 1994) (highlighting the
role played by the Center for Public Resources, Inc., a nonprofit group funded by Fortune 500
corporations, in encouraging increased usage of ADR by businesses in all aspects of contractual
relationships); Theodore B. Olson, The DangerousNationalSport of PunitiveDamages, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at A17 (reflecting the concerns of business interests that excessive jury
verdicts are crippling entrepreneurial activities).
5. Junda Woo, Baker & McKenzie Is Told To Pay PunitiveDamages, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2,
1994, at B3.
6. Andy Miller, Life of GeorgiaLoses $15 Million Judgment, ATLANTA CONST., June 3,
1994, at E3.
7. Steven A. Holmes, Some Employees Lose Right to Sue for Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Al (quoting Los Angeles attorney Paul Grossman).
8. See generally GEORGE W. SPmO, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 155-56 (1989).
9. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1988); see also infra notes 29-44 and accompanying text.
10. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
11. 500 U.S. 20 (1991); see also infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.
12. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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employment. In turn, several circuit courts of appeals soon applied Gilmer in
granting motions to compel arbitration of Title VII discrimination claims in
cases where the plaintiffs claimed they did not understand that they had waived
13
their right to a jury determination of their claims in advance.
As the demand for predispute arbitration agreements has increased among
employers, 14 some commentators have questioned arbitration's fairness to
complaining employees,'" particularly in the securities industry. 16 Yet,
employers are increasingly responding to Gilmer by requiring job applicants
7
to forfeit their statutory right to a jury trial as a condition of employment.'
Other companies make such agreements a condition for promotion or other
benefits.'" To limit the possibility of adverse arbitral rulings, some companies
have set up rules of arbitration that call for company-dominated arbitral
panels. Interestingly, the courts have used the FAA to enforce awards made
by these panels.19
13. See, e.g., Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992);
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 500 U.S. 930 (1991).
14. Wade Lambert, Employee Pacts to Arbitrate Sought by Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22,
1992, at BI. Lambert quotes several firm leaders as saying the following: "There's been a
groundswell of interest"; that small firms cannot "run the risk of taking a big hit in the court
system"; and that arbitration is "the new way of dealing with employment problems." Id.
15. See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, Men's Club-Riding Crop and Slurs: How Wall Street
Dealt with a Sex-Bias Case, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al (containing an in-depth portrait
of Helen Walters, who lost a "textbook" case of sexual harassment in which her boss repeatedly
referred to her as, inter alia, a "hooker" and a "bitch"). Complaints of sex discrimination in the
securities industry are dealt with by three-person arbitral panels
appointed and paid by an industry organization such as the New York Stock Exchange
or the National Association of Securities Dealers. But 89% of the more than 3,000
arbitrators used by those two big groups are men. Nearly half are retired, and the
average age of the men is 60.
Id. Between May of 1991 and June of 1994 at least 48 cases of sex, race, or age discrimination
were arbitrated by securities industry panels. Jacobs writes that "women are known to have
prevailed in only 2 of 16 cases in which the results could be verified ... [and] received
barebones awards." Id. Of the more than a dozen women interviewed who had been through
securities industry arbitration, "In]one thought the process, or the result, was fair." Id.
16. Diana B. Henriques, Wall St. ArbitrationPrograms Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1992, at D3. Henriques writes that the General Accounting Office's study of the securities industry found that arbitration claims by customers against brokerage firms "do not 'provide a
reasonable level of assurance regarding either the independence of the arbitrators or their
competence in arbitrating disputes.'" Id. Employment discrimination claims by securities firms
are handled by the same kinds of arbitral panels that handle investor/broker disputes.
17. Holmes, supra note 7, at Al.
18. Id. (noting that "[c]orporations like ITT, Hughes, Rockwell International, NCR, Brown
and Root[,] and Travellers have adopted policies that require arbitration for discrimination
claims.... [while others] like TRW, General Mills, MCI, and Conoco, are considering putting
similar policies into effect").
19. See Delaney v. Continental Airlines, 8 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1170 (C.D.
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Shortly after the decision in Gilmer, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (CRA-1991).' Along with the many divisive and difficult issues
resolved in CRA-1991, a seemingly innocuous provision endorsed the use of
ADR for resolving employment discrimination cases21 based on the
ADEA,I Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990.24 Section 118 of CRA-1991 provides:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations,
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration,
is encouraged to resolve disputes under the Acts or provisions of Federal
law amended by this title.2
Notwithstanding Gilmer and its subsequent application to Title VII cases,
as well as the ADR-supportive language of section 118, it is not clear whether
arbitration clauses in employer-employee agreements will invariably be
enforceable through the FAA. This uncertainty is the result of several factors.
There is still some question whether section 1 of the FAA exempts "contracts
of employment" in interstate commerce from the scope of the FAA's
enforcement provisions. Additionally, state laws limiting arbitration or limiting
arbitral remedies may not be entirely preempted by the FAA, especially where
the parties designate state law as controlling. Moreover, in legislating
section 118 of CRA-1991, Congress neither addressed whether "contracts of
employment" are excluded from the FAA's enforcement provisions nor
clarified the FAA's preemptive effect on state laws. Finally, some Supreme
Court Justices express doubt that Congress intended to enact substantive law
binding in state courts when it passed the FAA.26 Although these doubts have

Cal. 1993).
20. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amends Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988); and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1992).
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (currently codified

at 42 U.S.C.§ 1981 (Supp. IV 1992)).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).

23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (making it unlawful for employer "to fail to refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin").
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1992).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992).
26. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843-44 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also id. at 844-50 (Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
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recently been resolved in favor of stare decisis, several Justices suggest that
Congress should amend the FAA to allow more room for state action.2 7
This article reviews the FAA, the Gilmer decision, and subsequent
applications of Gilmer in light of continuing uncertainties over the FAA's
preemptive effect on state law restraints on arbitration. The Supreme Court's
present approaches to federalism and preemption may allow states to impose
limits on arbitration agreements and arbitral remedies, provided such limits are
consistent with the general purpose of the FAA: to ensure that "private
agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms." 28
In light of the aforementioned uncertainties, this article concludes that
further federal legislation is warranted and proposes specific changes to
existing federal law. In conjunction with expressly extending the FAA's scope
to include disputes arising out of agreements and contracts affecting interstate
commerce, Congress should require a "knowing and voluntary" waiver of jury
trials and specify minimum procedural safeguards to insure that employees'
claims are resolved in neutral forums. Until Congress takes affirmative steps
to clarify the permissible scope of the FAA, the judiciary will be required to
sort through the bramble bush of federalism, preemption, freedom of contract,
state laws, and private parties' choice of law. Clear guidance to both
employers and employees on a variety of issues affecting arbitration of
employment discrimination claims is still lacking, and that clear guidance must
come from Congress.
II. ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN "CONTRACTS OF EMPLOYMENT"
A. A BriefHistory of the FederalArbitrationAct
Congress passed the FAA in 1925 to encourage the use of commercial
arbitration as an alternative to litigating commercial disputes. A reading of the
legislative hearings indicates that the primary purpose of the legislation was
to enable merchants to rely on arbitration agreements to settle disputes
amongst themselves. 29

27. Id. at 843-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also infra Part IV, notes 217-34 and
accompanying text.
28. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989); see also infra
notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
29. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration:Hearings on S. 4213 & S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,67th Cong., 4th Sess. 14 (1923) (letter from Herbert Hoover, Secretary
of Commerce; Report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law of the
American Bar Association Re Federal Commercial Arbitration Act). Prior to 1925, the common
law of most states was hostile to predispute arbitration agreements. Judges often determined that
such agreements could not "oust the jurisdiction" of the courts. See, e.g., Cocalis v. Nazlides,
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Prior to passing the FAA, Congress became convinced that arbitration
was a useful alternative to litigation and decided that agreements to arbitrate

contained in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" would
be enforceable where an independent basis for federal jurisdiction existed.30
As a result, the FAA provided that a reluctant party to an agreement to
arbitrate could be compelled to arbitrate by a federal court,3 and that if a
party reluctant to arbitrate instituted litigation, a court could issue a stay order
and hold judicial proceedings in abeyance.32
Not all affected parties were happy with the FAA. At the time of the
FAA's passage, organized labor was wary of the federal judiciary and did not
want federal courts to have the power to order it to arbitrate disputes with
management. As a result and "at the behest of the Seamen's Union, " "
Congress added section 1: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts
of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.""
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act35 did not immediately clarify employment
arbitration issues. Section 301 of Taft-Hartley36 arguably made the failure to
abide by an agreement to arbitrate an unfair labor practice. Therefore, the
courts soon had to address whether arbitration agreements in collective
bargaining contracts were excluded from FAA coverage pursuant to section 1.
Among federal courts, considerable disagreement existed over whether parties
to a collective bargaining agreement could be ordered to arbitrate at all.37

139 N.E. 95, 98-99 (Il. 1923) (holding that a predispute arbitration agreement could not be
enforced because a state arbitration statute required submission of an existing controversy); Hurst
v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (holding that a postdispute arbitration agreement is not
binding because it ousts courts of their jurisdiction and is therefore against public policy).
30. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
31. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
33. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 470 (11th
Cir. 1987).
34. Id. at 470-71 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)).
35. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 amended the Wagner Act, passed in 1935 to protect the rights
of workers to form, join, or assist labor unions and to bargain collectively. The 1947 amendments
outlawed unfair labor and employer practices, such as refusing to bargain in good faith.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988).
37. Many courts held that the exclusionary language of § I barred the use of the FAA to order
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers
Union, 230 F.2d 81, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'don othergrounds, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); United
Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 193 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1952). But see
Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 91-93 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd
on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers,
235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United

Published by Scholar Commons, 1996

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:475

The issue was resolved in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,38 which
held that section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act was3 9a source of substantive
federal law, and thus, the FAA was not applicable.
Since Lincoln Mills, arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining
agreements have been governed by section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and not
41
the FAA. 40 As the Court's opinions in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
and Gilmer make clear, the Supreme Court treats arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements differently than like clauses in non-collective
bargaining agreements.4 2 In instances of collective bargaining, a distinct line
of cases would also limit the application of the section 1 FAA exclusion to
workers directly engaged in interstate commerce, such as bus drivers and truck
drivers.4 3 These cases place considerable emphasis on the textual arrangement
in section 1 that excludes "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce" from the application of the FAA.'

Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
38. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
39. The court of appeals had concluded that the FAA "does not authorize the judicial
enforcement of a contractual undertaking to submit to arbitration grievances arising under a
collective bargaining agreement." Lincoln Mills, 230 F.2d at 86. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority in Lincoln Mills, affirmed the district court's decree for specific performance of the
arbitration agreement based on § 301, but did not address the § 1 issue at all. Textile Workers
Union, 353 U.S. at 459. Justice Frankfurter urged in dissent that the Court explicitly recognize
"that when Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by the
federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts." Id. at 466.
Justice Frankfurter would have preferred that the Court, in finding authority under § 301 of TaftHartley to compel arbitration, also find that "Congress 'by implication' repealed its own statutory
exemption of collective bargaining agreements in the Arbitration Act." Id. at 467.
40. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union, 823 F.2d at 473 (holding "that collective

bargaining agreements are 'contracts of employment' within the meaning of the [FAA § 1]
exclusion"). But cf. Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union Number 9, 739 F.2d
1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding the FAA applicable to a collective bargaining agreement and
stating that the § 1 exclusion is "limited to workers employed in the transporation industries").
41. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
42. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is
CommercialArbitrationan "AdequateSubstitute"forthe Courts?,68 Tax. L. REv. 509,510-14

(1990). Schell notes a paradox: The Court has generally found arbitration inadequate to dispose
of federal statutory claims when interpreting § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, yet
entirely adequate to deal with complex federal statutory disputes. Id. at 511.
43. See, e.g., American PostalWorkers Union, 823 F.2d at 473 (refusing to choose a side in

the debate, but listing cases that have limited the section 1 exclusion to "'workers actually
engaged in interstate commerce'") (citations omitted).
44. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1994). This line of interpretation stresses ejusdem generis, pointing
to the specific categories of transportation workers that precede (and arguably limit or qualify)
the more generic category of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Thus, in Erving
v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972), the court found that
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B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane: Opening Arbitration
to Employment DiscriminationClaims
In 1981 the Charlotte, North Carolina, securities brokerage firm of
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) hired Robert Gilmer as
Manager of Financial Services for its main office. Prior to actual employment,
Gilmer had to register as a securities representative with several stock
exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). His registration
application to the NYSE was titled "Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration or Transfer," and provided for arbitration of any
"dispute, claim, or controversy" arising between him and Interstate "that [was]
required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the
organizations with which [Gilmer] register[ed]."' The NYSE's Rule 347
provided for arbitration of "[a]ny controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment
or termination of employment of such registered representative."46
When Gilmer was 62 years of age, Interstate ended his employment only
six years after hiring him. Gilmer suspected age discrimination and took his
claim to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The claim
was not conciliated through the EEOC so Gilmer brought suit in federal
district court, alleging that Interstate had discharged him because of his age.
In response, Interstate filed a motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of
the FAA. The district court denied the motion, but the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude
enforcement of arbitration agreements. " 4
Before the Supreme Court, Gilmer made the following arguments:
(1) noting the general insufficiency of arbitral procedures, Congress intended
ADEA claims to be litigated rather than arbitrated; (2) the agreement to
arbitrate was not freely negotiated; and (3) the Supreme Court's prior opinion
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.4" required reversal. The Court dis-

the § 1 exclusion did not apply because Julius Erving "clearly [was] not involved in the
transportation industry." See also Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971)
(holding that securities industry employees were not the type of workers "engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce" that Congress had in mind in drafting the § 1 exclusion); GAF Corp. v.
Werner, 485 N.E.2d 977, 980 (N.Y. 1985) (finding that a corporation that manufactured and sold
chemicals and other products was involved in interstate commerce and, therefore, the FAA
applied), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986).
45. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
46. Id.
47. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
48. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that a discharged employee whose grievance had been
arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement was not precluded
from subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon conduct that was the subject of the
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agreed, finding that Alexander was inapposite,49 that Congress had not
expressly precluded arbitration in creating causes of action under the
ADEA,5 0 and that Gilmer effectively made his choice to arbitrate. 51
Gilmer also contended that arbitration agreements should not be enforced
in ADEA claims because employers and employees have different bargaining
power. The Court countered that section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration
agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract,"52 and that there was no indication
"that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into
agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration application." 53
As will be made more evident below, the argument over choice will prove
instructive in considering the pre-emptive effect of the FAA, particularly
because state laws seeking to maximize freedom of choice for franchisees 5'
and auto dealers55 have been held to be preempted by the FAA. Yet some
courts have upheld state legislation or common law rulings limiting the power
of arbitrators to award punitive damages.56 Additionally, a contractual
agreement to abide by state rules of arbitration presumptively weakens the
FAA's preemptive powers. 7
Plaintiff Gilmer had not raised the issue of section l's scope in his
petition for certiorari, and the majority dealt with the issue of section l's
application to employment contracts in a footnote, "appropriately" not
addressing the section 1 issue as follows:

grievance).
49. Gilner, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
50. Id. at 26-29.
51. Id. at 33-34. The Court stated:
Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that
arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context .... "Of
course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to
arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract.'"
1d. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627

(1985)).
52. Id. at 33 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)).
53. Id.
54. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also infra notes 124-35 and
accompanying text (discussing Southland in detail).
55. See Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990); see also infra notes
146-52 and accompanying text (discussing Saturn in detail).
56. See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) (followed in Fahnestock
& Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1991)).
57. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also infra
notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing Volt in detail).
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In any event, it would be inappropriate to address the scope of the § 1
exclusion because the arbitration clause being enforced here is not
contained in a contract of employment .... The record before us does not
show, and the parties do not contend, that Gilmer's employment agreement
with Interstate contained a written arbitration clause. Rather, the arbitration
clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities registration application, which is
a contract with the securities exchanges, not with Interstate. 8
Thus, although the majority was willing to make Gilmer's agreement with the
NYSE contractually binding on Gilmer, it was unwilling to find that the
required registration application was part of Gilmer's overall employment
contract with Interstate. In dissent, Justices Stevens and Marshall argued that
the section 1 issue was logically
antecedent to the resolution of other issues
59
and should be addressed.
The Court rejected Gilmer's argument that the arbitration procedures in
the NYSE's registration application were inadequate because of the limited
discovery allowed in arbitration.' Gilmer argued that because discovery in
arbitration was more limited than in federal courts, he would have a more
difficult time proving discrimination.6" The Court disagreed, reasoning that
age discrimination claims did not require more extensive discovery than other
arbitrable claims and that the discovery provisions under the NYSE's
arbitration guidelines were adequate.62
The Court's conclusion ignores the fact that more detailed discovery may
often be required to prove a claim of employment discrimination.6' For
example, an employer's statistical hiring data may be essential to prove a
pattern of discrimination.' Under the limited discovery allowed in commer-

58. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (1991).
59. Id. at 36-37.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. See Christine G. Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?-SomeRuminations on the
ArbitrationofDiscriminationClaims, 11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 218 (1992); see also
Loren Kieve, DiscoveryReform, 77 A.B.A. J. 79, 81 (Dec. 1991) (proposing discovery reform
that would eliminate discovery entirely, but noting that employment discrimination is one area
where limited discovery would still be appropriate).
64. See Heidi M. Hellekson, Taking the "Alternative"out of the Dispute Resolution of Title
VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of ArbitrationAgreements
Arising out of Employment Contracts,70 N.D. L. REV. 435, 449 (1994) (noting that "discovery
in employment discrimination claims often involves extensive inquiries into the work environment
of the employer"); Susan E. Powley, Exploring a Second Level of Parity: Suggestions for
Developing an Analytical Framework for Forum Selection in Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 44 VAND. L. RaV. 641, 683 (1991) (noting that discovery is important in employment
discrimination cases because the statistical data needed to prove discrimination can be found only
in the employer's records); see also Kieve, supra note 63, at 81 (noting that in employment
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cial arbitration, this information might not be readily available, and the
plaintiff
would be denied access to the documents needed to prove his or her
65
case.

C. Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationCases After Gilmer
Any doubt whether the direct raising of a section 1 issue by a petitioner
would make a difference was soon put to rest. In Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.66 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a securities
broker must arbitrate her Title VII claims where the agreement to arbitrate was
contained in a securities registration form required by her employer. The form
was identical to the one in Gilmer, but unlike Gilmer, Willis raised the
section 1 issue directly. The Sixth Circuit Court agreed with Plaintiff Willis
and Justice Stevens that Congress did not intend the FAA "[to] be an act
referring labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants the
right or privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their
damages are, .. ."I Nevertheless, the Willis court felt bound by the Gilmer
decision and held the arbitration agreement to be enforceable.
In another discrimination case, the Fifth Circuit, following Gilmer, held
that a former employee's sexual harassment claim could be subjected to
compulsory arbitration. In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.68 the court
reconsidered its prior decision denying compulsory arbitration69 in light of
a specific remand from the Supreme Court.7" Alford, like Willis and Gilmer,
had been required to register with the NYSE as a condition of employment.
The Fifth Circuit, in remanding to the district court for reconsideration, noted
discrimination cases "the plaintiff needs to have access to the employer's statistical employment
information").
65. Currently, the American Arbitration Association's Employment Dispute Resolution Rules,
as amended and effective on November 1, 1993, permit discovery in large or complex
employment cases, but only with the arbitrator's discretionary approval. For example, the
Association's Rule 6 states:
In large or complex cases, at the request of any party or at the discretion of the
arbitrator or the AAA, a preliminary hearing with the parties and/or their representatives and the arbitrator may be scheduled by the arbitrator to specify the issues to be
resolved.. . . Consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration, the arbitrator may,
at the preliminary heating, establish (i) the extent of and schedule for the production
of relevant documents and other information ....
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES, Rule 6 (American Arbitration Assoc. 1993).
66. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 311 (quoting Hearings on S. 4213 & S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. to the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9 (1923)).
68. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
69. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated, 500 U.S.
930 (1991) (instructing the lower court to consider the case in light of Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20).
70. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Alford, 500 U.S. 930 (1991).
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that "[iln both this case and Gilmer, the arbitration clause was contained in the
employee's contract with a securities exchange, not with the employer."71
In Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc.72 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered an arbitration clause in an agreement between the
employer and employee. Dana Mago, an employee with E.F. Hutton,
completed and signed an employment application with Shearson after it
acquired E.F. Hutton. The application contained a broad arbitration clause.
Mago later brought a Title VII action against Shearson alleging gender
discrimination and sexual harassment.73 There is no indication that the
section 1 issue was raised at the trial court level.
Mago argued that Congress did not intend Title VII disputes to be subject
to arbitration pursuant to the FAA, but the court, relying on Gilmer,
concluded that she did not meet her "burden of showing that Congress, in
enacting Title VII, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under the
Act. "I Mago also raised the issue of adhesion in the district court. Following
the lead of Gilmer in holding that "[a] claim of 'unequal bargaining power is
best left for resolution in specific cases,'"'' the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of whether the agreement was one
of adhesion "under principles of federal law. "76
In Delaney v. ContinentalAirlines77 a federal district court in California
held that the arbitration provisions contained in a Continental Airlines
"Corporate Policy and Procedures Manual" were enforceable. Continental
Airlines discharged employee Thomas Delaney based on his unsatisfactory
work performance. 78 Delaney appealed his termination under the process
provided for in his employee manual. A three member board, consisting of
three officers of Continental, upheld his termination. 79 Delaney appealed the
arbitration award and argued that "the arbitration agreement was a contract of
adhesion."' He relied on Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., where the court
ruled that an arbitration clause found in a contract of adhesion is enforceable
unless it is contrary to "the reasonable expectations of the weaker or
'adhering' party" or is "unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable.'" '

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Alford, 939 F.2d at 230 n.1.
956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935. The court did not refer to § 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Id. at 934 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20).
Id.
8 Individual EmpI. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981) (per curiam) (en bane).
Id. at 172-73.
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Delaney argued that the arbitration process was "inherently biased" in
favor of the employer because the panel consisted only of company officers.
Thus, the agreement was beyond the "reasonable expectation of fairness" and
"unduly oppressive and unconscionable." 3 The district court rejected this
argument and stated that "'arbitrators need not be only independent, professional arbitrators or be selected from 'outside' the company."1 4 The court
further stated that panels comprised of employees and supervisors are not
inherently biased in favor of the company.'
Finally, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that an arbitration
agreement in a securities application was enforceable in Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth.s6 There, an employee sued Benefits for denial of a
promotion based on a violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act.' Once again, the arbitration clause at issue was a compulsory one in a
securities application. 8 The employee argued, on the basis of an isolated
remark in the legislative history of the CRA-1991,89 that the Gilmer decision
did not apply to employment discrimination claims. 90 The court held that
Gilmer applied to employment disputes and that the CRA-1991 did not modify
or undermine the Gilmer holding. 91 The court found that the statute did not
suggest that Gilmer no longer applied, and thus the court did not need to look
to the legislative history.'

83. Delaney, 8 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. at 1173.
84. Id.

85. Id. (relying on Fregara v. Jet Aviation Business Jets, 764 F. Supp. 940, 952 (D.N.J.
1991), where the court noted that a Board of Adjustment consisting of equal numbers of
employeesand employerswas "extremely fair"). Lang v. BurlingtonN. R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104
(D. Minn. 1993), reached a similar conclusion. In Lang, the district court held that an arbitration
policy added to an employee manual during an employee's employment was enforceable. The employee argued that the agreement was a contract of adhesion because he had only two choices:
(1) he could resign his position; or (2) he could continue working with the arbitration policy in
the manual. Id. at 1105. The court held that Lang "failed to show that Burlington Northern's
arbitration clause is inherently unfair," and that his continued employment constituted the acceptance and consideration necessary to make the agreement an enforceable contract. Id. at 1106.
86. 642 A.2d 1299 (D.C. 1994).
87. Id. at 1300; see D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to -2557 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
88. Klieforth, 642 A.2d at 1300.
89. Id. at 1305 n. 19. The employee relied on the following statement made by Rep. Edwards:
"mhe [House Committee on Educationand Labor] believes that any agreement to submit dispute
issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcementprovisions of Title VII." 1d. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt.
1, 97 (1991), reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 635).
90. Klieforth, 642 A.2d at 1305.
91. Id. at 1304.
92. Id. at 1305. In a concurring opinion, Acting Chief Judge Ferren noted his concern that
in some circumstances these types of agreements could constitute unconscionable contracts of
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Ill. SECTION

118 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

Although it is tempting to interpret section 118 of the CRA-1991 as
clearly affirming Congress' desire to make employment discrimination claims
arbitrable, a closer examination reveals that nothing in either the text or
legislative history explicitly indicates that Congress carefully considered the
section 1 issue, the Gilmer case, the troubling issue of the FAA's preemptive
scope, or the extent of its own powers under the Commerce Clause.'
In November of 1991, President Bush signed the CRA-1991 into law after
considerable debate in Congress and the country at large. Section 118 of the
CRA-1991 encourages ADR to resolve employment disputes "[w]here
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law." 94 Ironically, the CRA-1991
also expressly establishes jury trial rights. For Congress to establish jury trial
rights and expressly encourage arbitration in the same piece of legislation is
a bit of a policy puzzle. What were the underlying policy objectives of
Congress?
A. An Inconclusive Legislative History
The legislative history is not particularly revealing. The Senate did not
produce a Committee Report to support S. 1745, but two House committees
produced a joint report for two companion bills. Much of the content of CRA1991 was contained in House sponsored legislation, H.R. 1 (Democratic
leadership bill) and H.R. 1375 (Bush Administration bill). The House
Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on the Judiciary
both addressed ADR in committee reports. The Education and Labor Report
(H.R. 102-40, part 1) was dated April 24, 1991, and the Judiciary Report
(H.R. 102-40, Part 2) was dated May 17, 1991. Although the Judiciary Report
was dated a few days after the release of the Gilmer decision, it contained no
mention of Gilmer, and it appears that the Gilmer decision played no part in
the analysis of the committees.
The majority report of Education and Labor made clear that the use of
ADR "is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title
VII. " The report concluded that an agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration

adhesion. Id. However, Judge Ferren did not give any guidelines as to what circumstances would
be required to make mandatory arbitration clauses unenforceable as contracts of adhesion.
93. As to preemption and the FAA, see infra Part IV.
94. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 stat. 1071.
95. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 97 (1991) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 49, 635.
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does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the

enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. ...The Committee does not intend this section to be used to
96
preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available.
If "rights and remedies" are intended to refer to the substantive provisions
of Title VII, then arbitration would not be precluded. However, if "rights and
remedies" extend to the procedural right of jury trial provided under CRA1991, then it would seem to render meaningless the ADR provisions of
section 118.
The minority report of Education and Labor noted that H.R. 1375
specifically provided that any agreement to arbitrate must be "knowing and
voluntary."' The parallel provisions of H.R. 1 did not contain that stipulation, nor did the final version of CRA-1991. Congress considered, but rejected, the express requirement that ADR be voluntary. Thus, an implication can
be drawn that Congress approved of binding predispute arbitration agreements.
The House Judiciary Committee Report contained an analysis of ADR
virtually identical to the report produced by the House Education and Labor
Committee and concluded that "[t]he Committee does not intend for the
inclusion of this section to be used to preclude rights and remedies that would
otherwise be available. "s The minority report of the House Judiciary reached
the conclusion that the ADR section had no teeth, providing that "this section
is nothing but an empty promise to those claimants (and employers) who wish
to resolve their disputes without expensive litigation."" The report does not
make clear the reason the minority considered section 118 an "empty
promise," but an explanation might lie in the expectation that the holding of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.100 would extend to all employment
contracts. Neither side apparently anticipated the holding or impact of Gilmer
on the developing case law.
B. A Political Compromise with Little Guidance
While the Senate produced no Committee Report of S.1745, the extensive
floor debate in late October, 1991 produced substantive comment along with
political posturing by both the Democratic Party leadership and the Bush
Administration loyalists. Upon announcing the "compromise" on October 30,
1991, Senate Minority Leader (now Majority Leader) Bob Dole presented a
96. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 156.

98. Id. at 97.
99. Id. at 78.
100. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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section-by-section analysis of the Act representing the views of the Bush
Administration and the Republicans in the Senate. The coverage of section 118
is notably brief:
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including binding arbitration, where the parties knowingly and
voluntarily elect to use these methods.
In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing
sophistication and reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason
to disfavor the use of such forums. See Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).l
While Senator Dole's statement is the first legislative recognition of the
effect of the Gilmer decision on the debate, it does not appear to grasp the
import of the Gilmer holding. The Bush Administration clearly favored the use
of ADR over jury trials in the employment contract setting, but took no action
to amend the implied limitations on employment arbitration contained in
section 1 of the FAA.
Not to be outdone, Democratic Representative Don Edwards, subcommittee chair of the House Juidiciary Committee and principal author of H.R.1,
offered his "interpretive memorandum" during the House debate the following
week."° While acknowledging numerous language differences, he noted that
the Senate version of the CRA-1991 "achieved the same fundamental purposes
of H.R.1. " 1o° Like Senator Dole's statement of analysis, Representative
Edwards' "interpretive memorandum" could be viewed by the Supreme Court
as self-serving rather than as a legitimate legislative history. It does, however,
provide a stark contrast with the views of Senator Dole: "[t]his section
contemplates the use of voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after
they have arisen ....
No approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp."101
We conclude that neither Senator Dole nor Representative Edwards
represents the composite "intent" of Congress regarding arbitration because
Congress did not analyze or openly debate the policy implications of its
actions. Congress and the President, both under considerable pressure to
produce civil rights legislation, carefully considered a number of issues in
CRA-1991, but ADR was not one of them. Thus, arguments over legislative
intent are suspect. In terms of clear, unequivocal statutory language, the words
of section 118 do not at all address the scope of section 1 of the FAA. Furth-

101. 137 CONG. REc. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (emphasis added).
102. 137 CONG. REc. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards).

103. Id.
104. Id. at H9530 (emphasis added).
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er, section 118, in not addressing the Supremacy Clause issue, fails to clarify
congressional intent about the FAA's preemptive effect on state laws that
might limit the enforceability of arbitration clauses in contracts.

IV. THE FAA AND THE CONSTITUTION
Prior to 1925, many state laws actively discouraged arbitration.' 5 Even
now, a host of state laws would limit the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in certain cases."0 6 In general, these laws attempt to
ensure that superior bargaining power does not force the less empowered into
arbitration either when they do not know the meaning or implications of the
predispute arbitration or when they have no real choice. State laws often single

out predispute arbitration clauses in certain contexts" for non-enforcement
by state courts. Such laws appear to conflict with section 2 of the FAA, which
seeks to put contracts of arbitration on the same level as other contracts, and
to enforce them "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
08
revocation of any contract."
However, the command of section 2 does not, as of yet, amount to a
sweeping pronouncement that all predispute arbitration agreements will be
enforced by all state and federal courts, despite the frequent invocation of "the
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."" A threshold question never
fully resolved is whether Congress intended the FAA to apply in federal courts
as a procedural mandate, or whether Congress intended section 2 of the FAA

105. See supra note 29.
106. See William G. Phelps, Annotation, Pre-EmptionbyFederalArbitrationActofState Laws
ProhibitingorRestrictingFormationorEnforcementofArbitrationAgreements,108 A.L.R. FED.
179 (1992).
107. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), for example, California statutes
purported to protect franchisees from waiving their rights to judicial determinationof their rights.
See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text. In Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d
719 (4th Cir. 1990), the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act forbade nonnegotiable
arbitration provisions in automobile franchise agreements. See infra notes 146-52 and
accompanying text.
108. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). This section of the FAA provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
109. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the
majority declared § 2 of the FAA to be "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to
the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Id. at 24.
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to be substantive law binding in federal courts and having preemptive force
over inconsistent state laws.
If the FAA is procedural only, many complexities and incongruities
surface. In a case where the plaintiff seeks relief in state court based on a state
cause of action, state laws would often dictate nonenforcement of the
predispute arbitration agreement. In a case removable to federal court (either
because of diversity or because the state cause of action is joined with a Title
VII cause of action), though, federal procedural law will dictate enforcement
of the predispute arbitration agreement.
Assuming that the FAA creates substantive federal law binding on state
courts, two large questions of federalism and preemption remain unresolved.
The first is whether the parties can choose a particular state law to govern
their agreement and limit the application of federal law. For example, where
state law would refuse to enforce a predispute arbitration agreement in certain
kinds of transactions or would limit the remedies that an arbitrator could
award, will the parties' apparent preference for that state law be upheld by the
courts? Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees,1'" the answer appears to be yes. The FAA would
not have preemptive force even where the "choice" of state law is more or less
inadvertent for both parties. 1
The second large unresolved question is the scope of the FAA's preemptive powers. Given the lack of an express preemption clause in the FAA, to
what extent can states, consistent with the FAA, promote general laws of
contracts that limit enforcement of provisions which are unconscionable, adhesive, or otherwise unenforceable because of public policy considerations? This
section explores the following issues in detail: basic preemption doctrine, the
Supreme Court's three leading decisions on the FAA and preemption, recent
circuit court of appeals decisions on the same subject, recent trends in
Supreme Court analysis of the FAA and Constitutional questions, and analysis
of these trends and opinions with respect to section 118 of the CRA-1991.
A. The Supremacy Clause and TraditionalPreemptionDoctrines
Dating from the adoption of the Constitution, debate has continued over
the respective ranges of authority for the states vis a vis the federal government. The Constitution represents a great compromise between centralized and
decentralized authority, and the concept of shared sovereignty or federalism
has forever been a vexing one.I" As Justice Scalia wrote:

110. 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (discussing defects of the Articles of Confederation),
No. 28 (discussing the need for a national army), No. 59 (discussing the proposal of Congressio-
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[We have to bear in mind that [federalism] is a form of government
midway between two extremes. At one extreme, the autonomy, the
disunity, the conflict of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the
inflexibility, the monotony of one centralized government. Federalism is
meant to be a compromise between the two. 113
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause 14 would seem to give automatic
priority to federal law over state law when Congress constitutionally regulates
a given area. However, Congress often sets minimal standards and invites the
states to exceed them or it regulates without doing so comprehensively. Judicial doctrines of preemption have thus evolved to supply a series of
guidelines to discern when federal law forecloses state law on a similar
subject.
Before setting out these guidelines, the historical shifts between greater
and lesser centralized authority merit some mention. During the New Deal,
and at least through the 1960s, liberal Democrats favored national standards
while conservative Republicans often lamented the lack of local authority and
control. In general, preemption served to further the interests of those favoring
centralized authority. In the 1960s, federal laws favoring employees,
consumers, and the environment empowered individuals and held corporate
interests accountable. Yet, by the 1980s, lobbyists for corporate interests had
discovered that it was easier to focus on the levers of power in Washington
than to work with fifty state legislatures and bureaucracies. Business began to
lobby for uniform federal regulations that would preempt potentially more
1 15
protective state laws.

By the 1990s, "the sword of federal regulation evolved into the shield of
federal preemption."" 6 State laws were held preempted in areas ranging
nal regulation of its elections) (Alexander Hamilton), No. 39 (discussing concepts of republicanism, nationalism, and federalism), No. 51 (discussing proposal of checks and balances) (James
Madison); Paul A. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1954)
(discussing federalism and the role of the Court); Jeff Powell, The CompleatJeffersonan:Justice
Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1320-22 (1982) (discussing the history of
federalism); Paul Wolfson, Preemptionand Federalism:The MissingLink, 16 HASTrOS CONST.
L.Q. 69 (1988) (discussing the Supreme Court's failure to appreciate the link between preemption
and the Constitution).
113. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 19

(1982).
114. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
115. See Susan B. Foote,AdministrativePreemption:AnExperimentinRegulatoryFederalism,
70 VA. L. REV.1429, 1466 (1984); S.Candice Hoke, PreemptionPathologiesand Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 687, 690-99 (1991); Wolfson, supra note 112, at 87-89.
116. Henry H. Drummonds, The SisterSovereign States: Preemptionand theSecond Twentieth
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORUHAM L. Rv.469, 515
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from negligent failure to warn on cigarettes, to tort actions on pesticides, seat
belts, nuclear safety, and state consumer protection against fraudulent airline
advertising. Liberal Democrats began to see state and local governments as
living laboratories of democracy117 that were seedbeds for social and political
innovation. Federalism, as then-Professor Antonin Scalia noted, is a "stick that
can be used to beat either dog.""' Partly because federalism-and attendant
preemption doctrines-is ideologically neutral, the current Court's preemption
decisions seem to cut across perceived lines of liberalism or conservatism.
While most of the familiar preemption tests or guidelines have been repeated
in recent decisions, the current Court is developing a preference for Congressional clarity and decisiveness in marking out areas for preemption. This
preference may weaken the value of long-established judicial language on
preemption.
Traditionally, the Court has used a three-part analysis to determine
whether a given federal law preempts particular state action. First, the Court
will ask whether Congress expressed an intent to preempt. Second, if there is
no express intent, the court then asks whether such an intent could be implied.
In other words, does the language or structure of the federal statute evince a
Congressional intent to "occupy an entire field of regulation?"119 Third, even
where Congressional intent to preempt is not found, the Court has deemed
state law preempted where it either conflicts with federal law or "'stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' ""
Preemption on this third basis seems clear enough where an actual conflict
makes it impossible to comply with both the state and the federal law. Where
state law predates the federal law, Congress is presumably aware of the
Supremacy Clause, and the intent to prevail over the inconsistent state law can
safely be presumed. Where state laws originate after the federal law, the
Supremacy Clause operates, without any Congressional intent, to give priority
to federal law; a state law that cannot be complied with in a manner that is
also consistent with federal law becomes preempted.
However, absent actual conflict, this third guideline leaves considerable
room for speculation about "full purposes" and in some cases justifies judicial

(1993).
117. Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), said that one of the "happy incidents" of the federal
system was "that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Id.
118. Scalia, supra note 113, at 19.
119. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
120. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312

U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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activism in the preemption field.' If the presumption of dual sovereignty
and concurrent jurisdiction that lies at the core of our federal system is taken
seriously, the "obstacle to accomplishing Congress' full purposes" test must
be used with caution," lest judges find a message that suits their purposes
in the legislative text, structure, and history.
When confronted with the FAA, the federal courts initially did not see a
sweeping mandate for a uniform, federal substantive law of arbitration. Not
until the 1983 case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp. did the Court conclude that the FAA contained a "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements."" Perhaps coincidentally,
during this time period, the federal courts and the Chief Justice frequently
lamented the workload of federal appellate courts. Enforcing predispute
arbitration agreements that lead to final, binding arbitration is certainly one
way of reducing the caseload of federal courts. However, this apparent
judicial desire to increase the efficiency of case disposition in federal courts
seems counterbalanced by a renewed respect for federalism, which tends to
find less than sweeping preemptive force in federal laws unless Congress expresses such a sweeping intent.
B. The Volt Paradoxin FAA Preemption Doctrine:
State Laws as PrivateRules of Reference
The Court's philosophical shifts in thinking about federalism and
preemption are reflected in the Court's currently conflicted position on the
FAA's preemption of state laws affecting arbitration. In general, it appears that
the Court has adopted a strong federal policy favoring arbitration as substantive law binding on the states. Yet, most recently, the Court seems inclined to
read the basic purpose of the FAA as encouraging disputants simply to live up
to their agreements. In cases where the parties "choose" that the law of a
particular state should govern their agreement, the laws of that state that would
limit arbitration in some way may be given effect. Under this line of thought,
the state law's inconsistency with immediate enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate does not "frustrate the purposes and objectives" of the FAA because
the FAA's objective allows the parties to choose the law that will govern their
disputes.

121. See Dnummonds, supra note 116, at 533.
122. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (stating that the assumption that state law is not preempted
in the absence of a clear congressional mandate ensures that federal-state power sharing "will not
be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts").
123. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
124. Although § 10 of the FAA provides some right of appeal from arbitral awards, the
grounds are limited, and effective appeals are infrequent.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/4

22

Mayer: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge
19961Oakley andEMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION AND FEDERALISM

In Southland Corp. v. Keating"25 the Court indicated that any state law
limiting the scope or the remedies of the FAA's enforcement provisions would
be preempted. In Southland, the Court considered the California Franchise
Investment Law,126 which invalidated certain agreements otherwise covered
by the FAA. Franchisees of 7-Eleven convenience stores had numerous claims
against the franchisor, Southland Corporation, including claims alleging fraud,
oral misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure
requirements of California's Franchise Investment Law. From 1975 to 1977,
franchisees brought several individual actions in California state courts. In
1977, Keating brought a class action on behalf of these and nearly 800 other
franchisees against Southland. When all actions were consolidated, Southland
moved for arbitration of all claims by relying on the arbitration agreement
contained in all the franchise agreements. 127
The California Supreme Court ruled that claims under the Franchise
Investment Law were not arbitrable because the state law provided that "[a]ny
condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any
franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or
order hereunder is void. "128 The California Supreme Court interpreted this
portion of the law to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the
state statute.12 9
In a 7-2 decision 30 the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted the
California statute under the Supremacy Clause. Relying on Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,3' the majority reiterated
that the FAA "creates a body of federal substantive law" that is applicable in
both state and federal court.1 3 To the Southland majority "the underlying
issue of arbitrability [was] a question of substantive federal law."133 The
Court concluded that in creating the FAA, Congress "contemplated a broad
reach of the Act, unencumbered by state-law constraints."134 Justice O'Conn-

125. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
126. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31000-31516 (West 1977).
127. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 4. The agreement provided in part that any "claim arising
out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association... and judgment upon any
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction hereof." Id.
128. Id. at 5. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 31512 (West 1977).
129. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 5.
130. Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist dissented.
131. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
132. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12 (quotingMoses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at
25 & n.32); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)
(stating that "Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect
to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate").
133. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12.
134. Id. at 13.
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or offered a different analysis in dissent, asserting that Congress viewed the
FAA as essentially procedural and applicable only in federal courts. 3 '
Whether the FAA creates federal substantive law or is essentially procedural does make a difference; if procedural, the FAA applies only in federal
court. In the O'Connor view, cases like Southland, which are begun in state
court and based on state law, would be decided in accordance with state
substantive and procedural law, with the FAA having no preemptive effect.
The impact of the substantive-procedural debate has significant implications for
federalism. Without diversity cases the O'Connor/Rehnquist view would result
in FAA enforcement of arbitration clauses being limited to cases "arising
under" federal laws (other than the FAA) or the United States Constitution.
Thus, unless the FAA is substantive and clearly preemptive, some state courts
would enforce arbitration clauses and arbitral awards while others might not.
As long as there are diversity cases, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'36 requires
substantive state law to control. However, if the FAA is deemed to be federal
procedural law, the party seeking arbitration could remove the case to federal
court and compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA, thus allowing a
defendant to "forum shop" for enforcement of arbitration agreements and
awards. This result would be ironic because one of Erie'sprincipal concerns
related to forum shopping by plaintiffs for a different substantive law out-

come. 137
1. Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees:
A New FAA Preemption Doctrine
In the 1989 case of Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 13 1 Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to chart a new course for the FAA
preemption doctrine. In Volt, Chief Justice Rehnquist assessed the effect of a
California statute that allowed a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of
related litigation.13 Volt had a construction contract dispute with the
Stanford board of trustees (Board) and sought additional compensation for

135. Id. at 25.

136. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
137. This same concern led Justice Douglas to caution:
If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought. For the
remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the
cause of action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried
is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); see also infra notes 215-26 and accompanying text.
138. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
139. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982).
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extra work. The underlying contract contained a broad arbitration clause as
well as a choice-of-law clause providing that "'[t]he Contract shall be
governed by the law of the place where the Project is located.'"" Volt
formally demanded arbitration, and the Board then filed an action in California
Superior Court alleging fraud and breach of contract. The Board also filed suit
against two other companies involved in the construction project that were not
subject to arbitration agreements.
Volt moved to stay all litigation and compel arbitration under the FAA
and parallel provisions of the California Arbitration Act. Stanford argued, and
the Superior Court agreed, that the pending litigation with other contractors
raised the possibility of "conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or
fact."14 ' The permissive stay of arbitration provided by section 1281.2(c) of
the California Arbitration Act was, therefore, given effect. The California
Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied Volt's
petition for discretionary review.' 42
In affirming, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the "FAA contains no
express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to
occupy the entire field of arbitration."'43 The Chief Justice further noted that
the FAA's "primary purpose" was to ensure that "private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms. Arbitration under the Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit."'"
The Volt opinion clearly raises the possibility that preemption under the
FAA will not automatically occur where the parties have specified, however
indirectly, that state law will govern the relationship. By implication,
Southland would have been decided differently if the franchise agreements had
specified California state law as governing and the issue of a party's "freedom
to structure contracts" had been raised. The Volt opinion represents an
important break in the trend towards sweeping application of the FAA in
virtually all contract-based claims. As a result of Volt, FAA preemption of
state legislative or common law limits on arbitration procedures may or may
not be avoided by the parties through an appropriate choice of state law
clause.
In essence, the Court has moved from its earlier position that viewed the
FAA as mandating arbitration wherever and however chosen, to a new
position that interprets the FAA as favoring freedom of choice for the parties.
Because some state laws are expressly aimed at making sure that a knowing

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 470 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 37).
Id. at 471 (quoting CAL. Crw. PROC. CODE ANN. § 1281.2(c) (West 1982)).
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 479.
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choice of arbitration is made,145 the value of efficiency may be yielding to
the value of fairness implicit in the notion of informed consent. If the Volt
rationale is given full effect, the Supreme Court would uphold the parties'
"choice" of a state law, requiring parties to make knowing choices when they
agree to arbitration.
What is peculiar about Volt is that its logic holds that the FAA does not
preempt such laws where the parties have chosen them. Thus, Volt puts private
parties in a position to incorporate state law provisions that would ordinarily
be preempted by the FAA. In short, state laws control only where the parties
so choose. These laws are therefore not public laws of general applicability
but, rather, a set of laws that apply only if private parties choose them. It
seems doubtful that state legislatures, in passing laws designed to make sure
that parties knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to litigate, intended
merely to publish a set of additional rules of arbitration that parties may or
may not adopt.
2. The Circuit Courts: Following a Confrsing Lead
Circuit Courts of Appeals' cases decided after Volt can be classified into
two categories: cases where the arbitration agreement also has a state choice
of law clause and cases where the agreement does not have such a clause. In
the latter category, some disagreement over the preemptive scope of the FAA
is evident.
In Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams146 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered a case in which Virginia sought to protect retail automobile dealers by forbidding non-negotiable arbitration clauses in automobile
franchise agreements.147 The arbitration agreement did not contain a choiceof-law clause. Saturn tried to have its franchise agreements approved by the
Virginia commissioner, who rejected the mandatory, predispute arbitration
clause in the agreement. Consequently, Saturn sought declaratory relief in
federal district court. The district court denied such relief, holding that
Virginia could enforce its statutory provisions to prevent the formation of
mandatory arbitration agreements between automobile manufacturers and
dealers.
The circuit court reversed the district court and held that the FAA
preempted the Virginia statute. Writing for the majority, Circuit Judge

145. See, e.g., David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.)
(state statute requiring that arbitration clauses be introduced in 10-point type or larger), cert.
dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991); Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (state statute prohibiting arbitration clauses from being incorporated by reference).
146. 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983 (1990).
147. Id.
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Chapman rested his analysis on the Southland case, which he cited to show
that "'Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
'
Judge Chapman utilized the
enforceability of arbitration agreements.'" 148
basic test that states must "place no greater restrictions upon arbitration
provisions than they place upon other contractual terms. ""' It is not clear
that a majority of the Supreme Court agrees with this formulation. While the
Saturn majority adopted language that bears a distinctively Southlandtone, key
portions of the opinion seem at odds with Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of
the FAA as articlated in Volt.
Judge Widener filed a resounding dissent in Saturn, one which is arguably
more in tune with Volt and other recent preemption cases. Judge Widener
suggested that there is "a sliding scale in which a finding of pre-emption becomes more difficult as the tension between state and federal enactments
becomes more obscure." 50 The FAA, he pointed out, "contains no express
pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the
entire field of arbitration."' According to Judge Widener, a finding of
preemption must be supported by some direct conflict with the FAA. Furthermore, Judge Widener questioned whether the FAA was ever intended to
preempt all state laws that would render contracts void. In reaching this
conclusion, Judge Widener relied on the familiar maxim that "[i]n the face of
Congressional silence, 'there is a presumption against preemption.'""
Where Saturn is followed, its logic would dictate that the following kinds
of state laws would be preempted by the FAA because they "single out"
arbitration contracts:
(1) Statutes requiring that arbitration clauses be introduced in 10
point type or larger."5 3
(2) Statutes which require that arbitration clauses cannot be incorporated by reference. 4
(3) Cases that refuse on public policy grounds to enforce arbitration
clauses that put "all issues" before an arbitrator. 55

148. Id. at723 (quotingSouthland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)) (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 722.
150. Id. at 728.
151. SaturnDistrib.Corp., 905 F.2d at728 (citing VoltInfo. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at477).
152. Id. at 728 (quoting Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 849 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988)).
153. See David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. MetallgesellschaftLtd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991).
154. See Cook Chocolate Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
155. See, e.g., Paine, Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. McNeal, 239 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1977).
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(4) Common law prohibitions on arbitrators awarding attorney's fees
or punitive damages. 6
Where a choice-of-law clause is found, the circuit courts take a more
Volt-like view of the FAA's preemptive scope. In Fahnestock & Co. v.
Waltman 57 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals gave the FAA fairly narrow
preemptive scope when it confirmed an arbitral award of compensatory damages, but vacated the punitive damages. In that case, Fabnestock fired Waltman
in a corporate consolidation and filed a Form U-5 termination notice with the
National Association of Securities Dealers indicating that his "discharge was
occasioned by 'business consolidation.'"' 58 Subsequently, a dispute arose
over files for which Waltman made both legal and possessory claims.
Fatnestock made a claim for the files with the Director of Arbitration of the
New York Stock Exchange and also amended the U-5 form to state that "the
employee was under 'internal review'" for wrongful conduct.'"' 15 9 The
arbitrators awarded Waltman $56,000 in compensatory damages for wrongful
discharge, $100,000 for defamation, and $100,000 in punitive damages.
Fahnestock moved in federal district court"6 to vacate the arbitral award
under section 10(d) of the FAA, claiming that the arbitrators had exceeded
161
their authority.
The district court relied on a 1976 New York Court of Appeals decision,
Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,62 which held that an arbitrator had no power
to award punitive damages because such an award violated public policy in
New York state. Although the court in Garrity did not consider the issue of
preemption, the Fahnestockcourt did. The Fahnestockmajority recognized the
Southland holding ("Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts
to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements"), but immediately
cited Volt for the proposition that the "'FAA contains no express pre-emptive
provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field
of arbitration.'"" The majority also cited Volt for the proposition that "state
law may be applied in arbitration matters, subject to preemption only 'to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.'" " Simply put, "[w]hat the

156. See Phelps, supra note 106, at 223-25.
157. 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1991), and cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1120 (1992).
158. Id. at 514.
159. Id.
160. He based his motion on diversity of the parties.
161. Fahnestock & Co., 935 F.2d at 514-15.
162. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
163. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
164. Fahnestock & Co., 935 F.2d at 517 (citation omitted).
165. Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
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FAA requires is that parties comply with their agreements to arbitrate.""s
In this case, the parties failed to specify either New York law or the FAA.
Nonetheless, the federal district court presiding over this diversity case had to
choose whether the FAA prevented application of the substantive state law
policy.
The Fahnestockmajority noted that in a diversity action state law provides
the basis of decision and, ordinarily, the propriety of an award of punitive
damages for the conduct in question is an issue of state law. 167 Thus, the
Garrity rule prohibiting the arbitral award of punitive damages must be
applied. But the Fahnestock court also noted, by way of dicta consistent with
Volt, that if the parties had specified that the arbitrators could award punitive
damages, "a different outcome" might have been dictated. 16 The federal
substantive law rules "sweep aside any state attempt to interfere with the
agreement of the parties, "169 but do not guarantee the unfettered primacy of
FAA-based arbitration when the procedure conflicts with state law and state
public policy.
The dissent pointed out that "a state law which limits freedom of contract
with respect to arbitration agreements covered by the FAA conflicts with the
FAA and is preempted by it."170 Although the dissent took a broad view of
"actual conflict" for preemption purposes, the majority did not take such a
view. Accordingly, the court did not find actual conflict because its decision
did not prevent arbitration from going forward, did not prevent the parties
from specifying that the arbitrator could award punitive damages, and did not
prevent the arbitrator's award from being enforced.
C. Relevant Trends in the Supreme Court's Constitutional
JurisprudenceAffecting the FAA
1. Recent Preemption Cases
The Supreme Court's preemption ruling in Volt was followed the next
term by a closely watched tobacco warning label case. In Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.171 the preemption doctrine was analyzed in a context slightly
different from Volt. In Cipollone, despite a finding of express preemptive
intent on the part of Congress, the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted this

166. Id.
167. Id. at 518 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278
(1989)).
168. Id.
169. Fahnestock& Co., 935 F.2d at 518.
170. Id. at 520 (citing Saturn Distrib. Corp., 905 F.2d at 722).
171. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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preemption language and permitted a state law tort claim to be asserted. As
Justice Scalia explained in his dissenting opinion in Cipollone, "[t]he existence
of an express pre-emption provision tends to contradict any inference that
Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute's express language
72
defines. "1
As illustrated by Cipollone, the current Supreme Court appears determined to force Congress to either expressly articulate its intent to legislate
comprehensively, and thus "occupy an entire field of regulation, ""' or coexist with state regulation. Absent that clear expression, the Court appears to
be giving state legislative and judicial bodies great latitude to join in the
regulation of interstate commerce.
This view of preemption was reinforced in CSX Transportation,Inc. v.
Easterwood.'74 In Easterwood, the defendant's train collided with a truck at
a grade crossing in Georgia, killing plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff used
diversity of citizenship to bring a wrongful death action in the federal courts
against CSX Transportation (CSX). The plaintiff claimed "that CSX was
negligent under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices. . . and for operating the train at an excessive speed." 75 CSX defended
on the grounds of federal preemption under the Federal Railroad Safety Act
of 1970 (FRSA). The District Court granted summary judgment to CSX,
finding that both the warning device and excessive speed claims were preempted by the federal law. 176 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in
part and reversed in part, finding that the claim of negligence based on speed
was preempted while the claim based on the absence of proper warning
devices was not. 7
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. All the
Justices agreed that the claim based on Georgia negligence law was not
preempted. Justice White, writing for the majority, relied on Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 78 to distinguish between broad and narrow preemption
language. 179 Justice White reasoned that federal regulations that cover the
subject matter of state law focus more narrowly and thus have less preemptive
effect than more broad language that relates to the subject. 8 '
In section 434 of FRSA, Congress provided express preemption language:

172. Id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
174. 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993).
175. Id. at 1736.
176. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 742 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
177. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1552-58 (11th Cir. 1991).
178. 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
179. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1738.
180. Id. at 1737-38.
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The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards
relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule,
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as
the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering
the subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, or
standard relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce
an essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any
Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or18standard, and when not creating an
undue burden on interstate commerce.
For the Court, the use of the word "covering" in section 434 had significance and indicated that the accompanying preemption language should be read
narrowly." The Court interpreted section 434 in its proper context:
congressional recognition that states may continue to adopt or continue in force
laws and standards relating to railroad safety, even exceeding federal standards
if such state laws and standards are basically compatible with those federal
standards and do not "unduly" burden interstate commerce.
All the Justices agreed that the applicable federal regulations did not
"cover" the grade crossing where the accident took place because that crossing
had not received federal funds.' Thus, the FRSA did not preempt Georgia
laws or regulations designed to establish a level of proper warnings for the
crossing. In citing Morales, the Court noted that "[t]o prevail on the claim that
the regulations have pre-emptive effect, petitioner must establish more than
that they 'touch upon' or 'relate to' that subject matter."" This part of the
Court's decision re-emphasizes that the language and structure of express
preemption provisions will be carefully interpreted. The Court also reemphasized that "the presumption against pre-emption"" lies at the core of
its beliefs regarding federal-state power sharing.
Nonetheless, the majority found that the plaintiff's claim that the train was
being operated at an excessive speed was preempted. The difference was that
the Secretary of Transportation had used the authority granted by FRSA to
issue numerous regulations"8 6 that are quite specific and that relate to "different classes of track. . . defined by, inter alia, their gage, alignment [sic],
curvature, surface uniformity, and by the number of crossties per length of

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

45 U.S.C. § 434 (1988) (repealed 1994).
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. at 1738.
Id. at 1741-42.
Id. at 1738 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1739.
These regulations are codified at 49 CFR § 213.9(a) (1994).
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track."" s The crossing belonged to class four, where the maximum speed
for freight trains is 60 miles per hour. Mrs. Easterbrook conceded that the
CSX train was being operated at less than 60 miles per hour, but alleged that
CSX had breached a common-law duty to operate the train at a safe speed.' 88
The majority, however, read the regulations as comprehensively regulating
maximum train speed not only to place a ceiling on permissible speeds, but
also to preclude additional state regulation."8 9
The clear messages from Cippollone and CSX are that the Court will
begin with a presumption against preemption, will avoid putting any general
gloss on expressly preemptive language, and will not infer preemption unless
the federal law or regulation impliedly covers the same subject as the state's
laws or regulations, rather than merely relating to the same general subject.
In light of this presumption against preemption, states should be free to
fashion their own policies on arbitration, subject to the oft-stated requirements
that state law must not conflict with federal law or unduly frustrate the
"purposes and objectives of Congress."" 9° This is so because the FAA
contains no express preemptive language and does not invite concurrent
lawmaking by the states.
But when the statute involved is the FAA, the Court has been willing to
ignore its own recent preemption doctrine and to re-assert a strong federal
policy to preempt state laws that limit arbitration in any way, even in cases
based entirely on state-based causes of action heard in state courts.191 In
deciding Volt,"9 the Supreme Court certainly could have invoked language
to the effect that state laws must not conflict with federal law or unduly
frustrate congressional purposes and objectives. In most cases, the Supreme
Court sees the FAA as creating a substantive federal policy favoring immediate
enforcement of predispute arbitration provisions. Yet even though the
California statute at issue in Volt appeared to "stand[] as an obstacle" 193 to
enforcement of the FAA, the Court allowed the parties to choose California
law, with the net effect of at least delaying the arbitration.194 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that section 4 of the FAA "does not confer a right to compel
arbitration of any dispute at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an
order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the

187. Easterwood,113 S. Ct. at 1742.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
191. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
192. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
193. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
194. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 476-78.
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parties']agreement.'" 1" As long as the chosen state's law does not render
arbitration agreements unenforceable, parties are "'at liberty to choose the
terms under which they will arbitrate. ' ""
According to this rationale, the purposes and objectives of Congress in
passing section 4 of the FAA were not to command immediate arbitration, but
to enforce the dispute-resolution terms agreed to by the parties:
Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of
arbitration, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement
is fully consistent with the goals of the FAAs, even if the result is that
arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to go
197
forward.
2. Choice of State Laws in Arbitration:
The Constraintsof Mastrobuono
A similar issue involving state-law modification of federal norms for
arbitration was addressed by the Court's 1995 decision in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 9' In Mastrobuono the plaintiffs, residents of
Illinois, sued on a variety of state and federal claims, asserting that a Shearson
Lehman employee had mishandled their investment account. 199 Prior to
encountering any difficulty with the account, the Mastrobuonos had agreed
with the brokerage house to a clause that provided for arbitration of all
disputes.2w The Mastrobuonos also agreed to a New York state choice-oflaw clause."° When the Mastrobuonos became convinced that Shearson
Lehman was engaged in churning and unauthorized trading, the Mastrobuonos
sought relief in federal district court. The district judge granted the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of the FAA.32 After the
arbitral panel heard the claims, it awarded the Mastrobuonos $159,327 in
compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages.
Shearson
Lehman filed a motion in federal district court to vacate the punitive damages
award on the ground that New York law precluded arbitral awards of punitive
damages. The district court vacated the punitive damages award.'
195. Id. at 474-75 (citing 9 U.S.C. § (1988)).
196. Id. at 472 (quoting, with approval, the unpublished California Court of Appeal's
decision).
197. Id. at 479.
198. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
199. Id. at 1214.
200. Id. at 1217.
201. Id. at 1216-17.
202. Id. at 1214-15.
203. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.
204. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 812 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (N.D. Ill.
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs could not "avoid
their own choice of governing law."' Citing Volt, the Court determined
that the parties' choice of New York law required adherence to the New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,' which allows
courts, but not arbitrators, to award punitive damages.' Accordingly, the
arbitrators had no power to award punitive damages under New York law.
In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court
reversed, noting that there was an ambiguity in the contract that should be
resolved against the author of the contract language." 3 First, the contract
made no express reference to punitive damages. Second, although the contract
called for the application of New York state law, it also provided that any
controversy arising out of the parties' transaction would be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the rules of either the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) or the Boards of Directors of the New York Stock
Exchange or the American Stock Exchange. The NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure allows arbitrators to award "damages and other relief," which
Justice Stevens declared "broad enough at least to contemplate such a
remedy" 9 as punitive damages. Moreover, the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange do not limit the power of an
arbitrator to award punitive damages. Taking all the contractual provisions
together, the Court did not find an intent to preclude an award of punitive
damages. 1 0
Mastrobuono does not mean that the FAA requires parties to allow
arbitrators to award punitive damages. Rather, the Court held merely that the
Mastrobuonos were unlikely to have been aware of New York's approach to
punitive damages and probably had no idea that, in signing the standard
contract form "they might be giving up an important substantive right." 2"1
Mastrobuono leaves open the possibility, however, that parties could by
contract expressly preclude the power of an arbitrator to award punitive
damages. Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono is primarily an
exercise in common law contract interpretation, giving deference to the
arbitrator's presumed interpretation of the parties' intent to include, or at least

1993).
205. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1994).
206. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
207. Mastrobuono, 20 F.2d at 716-17.
208. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219 (citations omitted).
209. Id. at 1218.
210. Id. at 1219 (citations omitted). The Court's holding is also consistent with its
pronouncements in Volt that "due regard must be given to the federal policy of favoring
arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [should be] resolved in
favor of arbitration." Volt Info Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
211. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219.
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not to preclude, punitive damages. The decision is consistent with Volt because
both cases give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement
to arbitrate.
However, there are important differences between Volt and Mastrobuono.
First, in approaching the choice-of-law clause, the Court in Mastrobuono did
not give effect to the full range of the law as it affected arbitration.1 12
Second, the Court in Mastrobuono gave import to the plaintiff's lack of
awareness that "they might be giving up an important substantive right."23
3. From Bernhardt to Dobson: Rethinking the
Judicial Creation of Preemptive Substantive Law
Aside from any limits imposed by the section 1 exclusion of "contracts
of employment" in interstate commerce on the FAA's scope, 21 4 it has often
been argued that there are constitutional limits on the reach of Congressional
powers under the Commerce Clause. It therefore follows that the FAA cannot
preempt any state law if to do so would reach beyond Congress's powers
under the Constitution.
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America2 5 the Court concluded that
the stays of judicial proceedings authorized by section 3 of the FAA216 could

212. Justice Thomas, in dissent, found no persuasive difference between the choice of law that
the parties made in Volt and the choice-of-law provision in the Mastrobuonos' contract. Id. at
1220-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). His comments on the majority position are direct and
intellectually persuasive. Justice Stevens' comments suggest that a choice-of-law clause itself can
be ambiguous, such that even if other elements of the contract did not point to the possibility of
punitive damages, the choice of law "might include only New York's substantive rights and
obligations, and not the State's allocation of power between alternative tribunals." Id. at 1217.
Justice Stevens' reasoning here is not supported by citation to any authority, and the
distinction strikes us as a difficult one, not easily comprehended or likely to be consistently
applied by courts. Not only is it novel to distinguish rights and obligations from allocations of
power between alternative tribunals, but it is equally clear that an important, substantive public
policy can deny arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. See Garrity, 353 N.E.2d at
793.
213. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219.
214. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); see supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
215. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
216. Section 3 reads:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue
involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the
applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
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reach no further than those contracts covered by sections 1 and 2. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, could find "no showing" that the petitioner
"was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was
engaging in activity that affected commerce, within the meaning of [the

Court's] decisions. "217
Bernhardt, the petitioner, was a resident of New York when he signed2 a
contract of employment with Polygraphic, a New York corporation. 1
Bernhardt later became a resident of Vermont, where, as the contract had
envisioned, he worked for Polygraphic.219 The contract provided for
"arbitration under New York law by the American Arbitration Association. .. " After a dispute with his employer, Bernhardt brought an
action in Vermont state court. Polygraphic removed the case to federal district
court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Under Vermont law at that
time, agreements to arbitrate were revocable at any time prior to an
award.Y
The Bernhardt Court's finding of no interstate commerce raised a
problem: that a federal court in Vermont, sitting in diversity, could not simply
apply the FAA as a federal procedural law. According to Justice Douglas,
application of the FAA would clearly undercut the principles underlying Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins" 2 because the choice of arbitration would have
substantive results.'

217. Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 200-01. Justice Douglas relied on the language of § 1 of the FAA
to define the limits of "commerce," and could find no commerce "among the several States" in
Bernhardt's activities as an employee of Polygraphic Co. Id. at 201 n.3.
218. Id. at 199.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 199-200.
222. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
223. Justice Douglas noted that "the federal court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity
case is ... in substance 'only another court of the State.' The federal court therefore may not
'substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.'" Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at
203 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945)). Justice Douglas
continued:
If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought. For the
remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the
cause of action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried
is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from
a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is guaranteed both by the Seventh
Amendment and by Ch. 1, Art. 12th, of the Vermont Constitution.
Id.
Justice Douglas' concerns were mirrored by Justice O'Connor's concurrence, Justices
Scalia's dissent, and Justice Thomas's dissent in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115
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It should be noted that the Court decided Bernhardt prior to its pronouncement in Moses H. Cone of "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements, .... ",, In Bernhardt, unlike in Moses H. Cone, the employee
was working in a state with no particular connection to surrounding states.
Thus, although Moses H. Cone seems to implicitly overrule Bernhardt,with
the result that a similar case could now successfully invoke sections 3 and 4
to preempt any state law that would delay arbitration, there is reason to ask
two questions. First, if Bernhardt and Polygraphic Co. really were not involved in interstate commerce, how can any part of the FAA constitutionally
apply?'s Second, if the parties had chosen New York state law, but New
York conflict-of-laws principles would have led to the application of Vermont
law, would the Volt rationale require a court to honor the parties' choice and
refuse to stay the litigation pending compulsory arbitration?'
The Supreme Court revisited Bernhardt in granting certiorari to a case
decided by the Alabama Supreme Court in 1994.27 In Dobson, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that a contract for a termite bond on a house in
Fairhope, Alabama, did not involve interstate commerce. The arbitration
agreement in the contractms was therefore held not to be enforceable under

S. Ct. 834 (1995).
224. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
225. See Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 840. The answer seems to be that Bernhardt and his employer
were engaged in activities affecting interstate commerce, despite the fact that Bernhardt's
activities on behalf of Polygraphic were all in Vermont.
226. Following Volt, the parties' choice, however inadvertent, would be honored. The FAA's
purpose is not to support arbitration per se; rather, the FAA's purpose is to enforce contracts to
arbitrate according to their terms on the same basis as other contracts. See supra notes 138-45
and accompanying text.
227. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993), rev'd, 115 S. Ct.
834 (1995). On appeal to the Supreme Court, the attorneys general of nineteen other states filed
amicus briefs in support of the Dobsons. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 838-39. They argued that the text
and structure of the FAA clearly indicate that the FAA does not apply to proceedings in state
court and that Southland Corp. was incorrectly decided. Id.
This case is ultimately more about federalism than about arbitration. Amici submit
that each State is entitled to decide for itself how to govern proceedings in its own
courts. Most of the States have chosen to facilitate arbitration. But the FAA should
not be read to compel them to do so.... We recognize that statutory interpretations
should not be discarded lightly. But Southland's extension of the FAA to state courts
was rendered without briefing based on an imprudent concessionby a private litigant,
is demonstrably incorrect, and is in tension with important principles of judicial
restraint and federalism as reflected in such recent decisions in O'Melveney & Myers
v. FDIC, No. 93-489 (June 13, 1994), New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408
(1992), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
Brief Amici Curiae of the Attorneys General, 40.
228. The arbitration agreement contained in the Termite Protection Plan provided that "any
controversy or claim ... arising out of or relating to the interpretation, performance or breach
of any provision ofthis agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration." Dobson, 115 S. Ct.
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the FAA since the parties did not, when they entered into the contract,
contemplate "substantial interstate activity.""
Allied-Bruce Terminix, the defendant, was an Arkansas corporation doing
business in Arkansas, Texas, and several southern states. A termite bond was
purchased by Mr. and Mrs. Gwin prior to transferring title to the Dobsons.
Terminix International, a partnership with its principal place of business in
Memphis, Tennessee, guaranteed the bond. 0 At closing, the Gwins provided the bond, which was transferable, along with an inspection certificate
stating that there was no visible evidence of infestation." After closing, the
Dobsons discovered termite damage to the house and brought an action against
the Gwins alleging fraudY The Dobsons also filed suit against Terminix
Service and Terminix International, alleging fraud and breach of contract.
Terminix Service and Terminix International moved to stay the proceedings
and to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause in the bond. 3
Under Alabama law, predispute arbitration agreements are not enforceable. 4 However, the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that "if an
arbitration agreement is voluntarily entered into and is contained in a contract
that involves interstate commerce, then the FAA preempts state law and
renders the agreement enforceable."" Terminix Service and Terminix
International argued that "because some of the materials used in fulfilling their
duties imposed by the termite bond were brought into Alabama from out-ofstate [sic], the bond has at least a 'slight nexus' with interstate commerce."" 5 However, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the FAA applies
only if, at the time the that parties enter into the arbitration agreement, they
"contemplated" substantial interstate activity.73'
Justice Breyer, writing for the Court majority, found that the FAA
preempted Alabama's anti-arbitration law. 8 Focusing on section 2 of the
FAA, the Court parsed the word "involving," noting that Congress uses the
word "affecting" to signal its intent to exercise Commerce Clause powers to
the fullest.23 9 Appealing to the Oxford English Dictionary, legislative

at 837.
229. Id. at 355.
230. Id. at 354.
231. Id. at 354-55.
232. Id. at 355.
233. Dobson, 628 So. 2d at 355.
234. Id. (citing Ala. Code § 8-1-41(3) (1993)).
235. Id. (citation omitted).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 355-56.
238. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 837-39.
239. Id. at 839 (citing Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 (1985)).
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history, and, dispositively, Southland Corp. v. Keating,' ° however, the
Court determined that the choice of the word "involving" in the FAA indicated that Congress intended to exercise its commerce clause power to the
fullest.241 Consequently, the Court found that the transaction in Dobson
involved interstate commerce.242 The Court recognized that "[t]he pre-New
Deal Congress that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought the
Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned out to be so. " 243 Yet,
in expanding the scope of the Commerce Clause itself, the Court noted that it
has often expanded the scope of statutes that rest on Congress's power to
regulate commerce. 2 Under the FAA, exercise of the Commerce Clause
power to the fullest includes application of the FAA in circumstances where
the parties' activities in fact touch upon or involve interstate commerce,
regardless of the contemplation of the parties. 5
The majority's discussion of Bernhardtis also instructive. In Bernhardt
the Court concluded that the contract itself did not "involv[e]" interstate
commerce and thus fell outside the scope of the FAA.1 6 Yet, the Dobson
majority noted that "the Court's opinion does not discuss the implications of
the 'interstate' facts . . . ." The Court apparently was suggesting that a
contract between a New York resident and a New York company for work in
Vermont may implicate sufficient "interstate" connections to fall within the
full constitutional reach of the Commerce Clause. The Court thus implied that
Justice Douglas's opinion did not in fact construe the word "involving" in
section 2, but rather concluded simply that Bernhardt's work for Polygraphic
in Vermont did not involve interstate commerce.
Thus, because of section 2 and judicial reaffirmation of Southland, the
FAA continues to apply as substantive law in state and federal courts to the
full reach of the Commerce Clause power, regardless of original congressional
intent. Although Bernhardt has not been expressly overruled, its conclusion
that an employment contract might be beyond the full reach of the Commerce
Clause has minimal impact. When certain employers have only a few
employees whose duties are limited to a circumscribed geographic area that is
insulated from interstate activity, one might argue successfully that the FAA

240. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
241. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 839-40.
242. Id. at 843.
243. Id. at 840.
244. Id. (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976)).
245. Id. at 842. Justice Breyer noted that the parties "do not contest that the transaction in this
case, in fact, involved interstate commerce." Id. at 843.
246. See Bernhardt,350 U.S. at 200.
247. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 841.
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should not apply. In such cases, federal employment discrimination laws are
not likely to apply in any event.248
D. The Likelihood of Southland Being Overruled
by the Supreme Court
Dobson, joined by the attorneys general of twenty states as amici curiae,
mounted a strong challenge to Southland's constitutional validity. Amplifying
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Southland, the respondents and amici urged that
Southland be overruled as a flawed precedent that had needlessly preempted
state freedom of action.249 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Dobson, claimed:
Adhering to Southland entails a permanent, unauthorized eviction of statecourt power to adjudicate a potentially large class of disputes....
I shall not in the future dissent from judgments that rest on Southland.
I will, however, stand ready to join four other Justices in overruling it,
since Southland will not become more correct over time, the course of
future lawmaking seems unlikely to be affected by its existence, and the
accumulated private reliance will not likely increase beyond the level it has
already achieved .... 250
Justice Scalia also joined Justice Thomas' dissent. Both argued that the
FAA applies only in federal courts." In 1925, laws governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements, directed as they were to the mechanisms of
dispute resolution, were generally considered to be procedural rather than
substantive and to constitute a species of forum-selection clause. 2 Justice
Thomas found the legislative history of section 2 to buttress the view that the
FAA is procedural,' and found further support for such a view in "[t]he
context of section 2" within the FAA.254 Justice Thomas cited words in
sections 3 and 4 that point to "the courts of the United States"255 and "any
United States district court,"256 and offered further references to federal

248. Title VII, for example, applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current year. 42 U.S.C. § 701(b)

(1988).
249.
844-45
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 838-39 (1995); see also id. at
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 845 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 845-47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988). Section 3 provides for stays of judicial actions in federal courts.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988). Section 4 provides for orders to compel reluctantparties to arbitrate.
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courts in sections 7 and 9 that give the FAA an unmistakably federal
focus."57 He found that the absence of a reference to federal courts in
section 2 could not, despite Southland, reasonably be read as congressional
intent to create a substantive law binding on state courts as well as federal
ones. s
The heart of this argument echoes Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Southland. 9 If the FAA is procedural, meant to be binding only in federal
courts, preemption of state laws that limit arbitration is not possible. Only if
the FAA were seen as creating substantive rules or standards could preemption
occur. Section 2 is the principal candidate for creating such a substantive rule
because the other key sections are primarily procedural. But, according to
Justice Thomas:
[i]f § 2 really was understood to "creat[e] federal substantive law requiring
the parties to honor arbitration agreements," then the breach of an
arbitration agreement covered by § 2 would give rise to a federal question
within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Yet the
ensuing provisions of the Act, without expressly taking away this
jurisdiction, clearly rest on the assumption that federal courts have
jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agreements only when they would have
had jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. 20
Justice Thomas appealed to "core principles of federalism" in reminding
the majority not lightly to assume that Congress is legislating in areas
traditionally regulated by the states.261 "Rather, we must be 'absolutely
certain' that Congress intended such displacement before we give preemptive
effect to a federal statute."I 2 This view is more consistent with recent Supreme Court preemption cases such as Cippollone6 3 and CSX,21 but
considerations of stare decisis hinder any overrule of Southland. As Justice
Breyer noted:

257. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 847 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
260. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Southland Corp., 465 U.S.
at 15 n.9) (citations omitted). Even the Southland majority conceded as much, noting that the
FAA "does not create any independent federal-questionjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
otherwise." Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15 n.9 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)).
261. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 848 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)).
263. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992); see supra notes 171-73 and
accompanying text.
264. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993); see supra notes 174-89 and
accompanying text.
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Nothing significant has changed in the 10 years subsequent to Southland;
no later cases have eroded Southland's authority; and, no unforeseen
practical problems have arisen. Moreover, in the interim, private parties
have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority. Further,
Congress, both before and after Southland, has enacted legislation
extending, not retracting, the scope of arbitration. For these reasons, we
find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established
26
law. 5
Justice O'Connor, who concurred with some reservations, 2 continued
"to believe that Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply
in state courts, and that this Court has strayed far afield in giving the Act so
broad a compass." 267 In light of federalism and recent preemption doctrine,
Justice O'Connor found the broad formulation of section 2 "troublesome" and
would have given greater respect to state statutes "carefully calibrated to
protect consumers " 2 s and "procedural requirements aimed at ensuring
knowing and voluntary consent." 269 Like Justice Thomas, she reminded the
majority of recent preemption doctrines, yet recognized that "over the past
decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation."270 It was only in deference to stare
decisis that she was willing to "acquiesce" in the majority's judgment. 271
"Though wrong," she wrote, "Southland has not proved unworkable, and, as
always, 'Congress remains free to alter what we have done.'"2'l

265. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. at 839 (citations omitted).
concurring).
266. See id. at 843 (O'Connor, J.,
267. Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
268. Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citingMONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(b) (1993),
which denies enforcement to arbitration clauses in consumer contracts where the consideration
given is $5,000 or less).
269. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993), which requires that
notice of an arbitration provision be placed prominently on the first page of the contract). These
types of state protections would be preempted without a choice-of-law clause in the underlying
agreement because both put arbitration agreements on a different scale from other kinds of
contracts.
270. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote, "Ihave
no doubt that Congress could enact, in the first instance, a federal arbitration statute that displaces
most state arbitration laws. But I also have no doubt that, in 1925, Congress enacted no such statute." Id.
271. Id.
Justice O'Connor stated, "[A]s the Court points out, more than 10 years have passed
since Southland, several subsequent cases have built upon its reasoning, and parties have
undoubtedly made contracts in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the Act in the interim."
Id.
272. Id.(quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989)).
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Justice Thomas, on the other hand, saw "no reason to think that the costs
of overruling Southland are unacceptably high,"273 especially when the FAA
was not necessarily within the contemplation of the parties when they entered
into the contract. Parties are apt to comply with the agreement and arbitrate
either as a matter of keeping promises or on the theory that arbitration is a
cheaper and better way of resolving the dispute. Moreover, in a large number
of states, specific enforcement of the arbitration agreement would be available
under state law: "Only Alabama, Mississippi, and Nebraska still hold all
executory arbitration agreements to be unenforceable, though some other
[s]tates refuse to enforce particular classes of such agreements."274
Because of Justice O'Connor's written acquiescence to Southland's view
of section 2 and Justice Rehnquist's decision to join the majority, the Court
will adopt the view that the FAA is procedural only if Congress acts. Even
while concurring, Justice O'Connor called for the preservation of autonomy
in state courts.2 75 With the new majority in the 104th Congress, devolution
of power to the states is often a persuasive argument,276 and clarification of
the extent of congressional intent that the FAA preempt may yet come.
E. Section 118 and the Prospects
for FAA Preemption of State Law
In suggesting that ADR would be a beneficial approach to resolving
employment discrimination disputes, Congress did not address the general
scope of the FAA or its preemptive possibilities. Dobson2 7 and Mastrobuon0278 leave standing the Volt-like279 view that the FAA favors enforcement
of the parties' own choice, which may refer either to state laws that limit
arbitration or arbitral remedies, or to laws that expressly limit the scope of
arbitral remedies. After Volt, lower courts have split on whether state laws
limiting punitive damage awards by arbitrators should be honored. Even

273. Id. at 850 (Thomas, J.,dissenting).
274. Id. (citations omitted).
275. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. at 844 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
276. See R.W. Apple, Jr., You Say You Want a Devolution, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1995, § 4,
at 1. "For Newt Gingrich and the band around him, his words are words to live by: 'We are
comnnitted to getting power back to the states... and we believe you can trust the 50 states and
the 50 state legislatures to work together on behalf of the citizens of their states.'" Id.
277. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
278. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
279. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
280. See, e.g., J.Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826 (Ct. App. 1993)
(refusing to set aside a punitive damage award despite New York choice of law clause), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994); 3. Alexander Sec., Inc. v. Mendez, 114 S.Ct. 2182, 2182-83
(1994) (O'Connor, J.,dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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after Mastrobuono, courts are likely to differ in their interpretations of what
the parties to a standard form contract intended in terms of remedies or
procedural rights. Moreover, the majority's language in Mastrobuonosuggests
that a choice-of-law clause may in effect be an exercise in choice-of-laws
management by the parties, such that their intent is only to specify "substantive rights and obligations" rather than to make "allocation[s] of power
between alternative tribunals."" As noted earlier, this distinction is not
easily applied and may invite further litigation.' Other cases that involve
parties who choose state law to govern their dispute pose similar issues, and
invite courts to read Volt's interpretation of the FAA to ensure that they
enforce the expressed (or purported) intent of the parties rather than enforce
arbitration per se.
Whatever the awareness of Congress about such issues, the language of
section 118 of the CRA-1991 clearly does not address the problems posed by
participants who "choose" in their agreements to be governed by state law that
in some way limits enforcement of arbitration. Nor does section 118 mention
the FAA or state a preference for preemption of inconsistent state law. In
short, section 118 supports neither the inference that Congress intends
arbitration agreements, predispute or otherwise, to be governed by a single set
of federal standards, nor the view that states should be free to fashion their
own substantive or procedural rights or remedies to accompany arbitrations
enforced under the FAA.
Given Dobson and Mastrobuono, appears that there is little room left for
state law where the FAA is involved. But a minority of Justices continue to
believe that the FAA's preemptive intent is entirely a creation of the courts,
not Congress. Because the Mastrobuonomajority apparently felt free to invoke
the common law of contracts in finding no congressional intent to preclude an
arbitral award of punitive damages, it seems fitting to ask how else an agreement to arbitrate might not be "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" under
section 2 of the FAA because of "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. "" Common law, however, might qualify to
provide general grounds to resist enforcement. We thus turn our attention to
common-law grounds of adhesion as a potential basis for not enforcing
predispute arbitration provisions that are agreed to by employees, whether
involuntarily or unknowingly.

281. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217.
282. See supra note 212.
283. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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V. PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT: UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS OF ADHESION?

It is beyond dispute that many employment contracts contain predispute
arbitration provisions that are either not seen or not understood by the
employee. Often, the predispute arbitration agreement is part of a much larger
document or set of documents that the employee or applicant is asked to sign.
In Gilmer the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) registration application was
not an optional document; Gilmer's choice was to sign it or seek work
elsewhere.' If his chosen field was stock brokerage, registration with the
NYSE was not optional because all brokerage firms with seats on the NYSE
require the same NYSE registration application. His real choice, in effect, was
to work in the securities industry or in some other line of work.
Gilmer argued that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced
because there was "unequal bargaining power" between the two parties. The
Court rejected his argument, stating that "[in]ere inequality in bargaining
power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are
never enforceable in the employment context."2 Although the Court
reserved a possible place for the occasional and extreme case where "'fraud'"
or "'overwhelming economic power'" could render the predispute arbitration
agreement unenforceable,ss such cases have not yet come to light, and it is
difficult to imagine many cases of economic power more overwhelming than
that of the United States securities industry relative to one applicant for
employment in a brokerage firm. In what follows, we explore the law of
contracts of adhesion to see what, if any, limitations state common law might
place on the enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements.
A. Development of the Common Law of
Adhesion and Unconscionability
In Gilmer the plaintiff argued, in essence, that the "take it or leave it"
nature of his agreement to arbitrate made it a contract of adhesion. A contract
of "adhesion" is an agreement where one party has no viable alternative but
to accept the terms proffered by the other.'

284. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
285. Id. at 33.
286. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627 (1985)).
287. See E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS § 426 (1982); see also JOHN D. CALAMA i
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONRACTS 422 n.78 (3d ed. 1987) (citing authority that
a contract of adhesion "is characterized by a lack of negotiation"). Commentators and courts also
use the term "take it or leave it" to connote the same type of agreement. See 3 ARTHuR LTrrON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON COTRACTS § 559C (Supp. 1994); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract,and
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Because of public policy, courts have often been unwilling to enforce contracts

of adhesion.

8

This unwillingness is not surprising because at common law

there was considerable precedent for the view that some contracts should not
be enforced where a class of people obviously need protection.289
This judicial unwillingness to enforce contracts of adhesion paralleled the
growth of printed form contracts, which were a natural consequence of the
growth of large industrial organizations. 2" However, the law governing the
enforceability of agreements made by parties with wide disparities in bargaining power has been in a state of turmoil for the past half-century. 291 As is

Territory, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1989); Lee Goldman, My Way And The Highway: The Law and
Economics of Choice of Forum ClausesIn Consumer Form Contracts,86 Nw. U. L. REv. 700
(1992). The preeminent seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke, who extolled the
virtues of private contract rights, would likely suffer serious culture shock if he were transported
through time to McDonalds and tried to bargain on the price of a Big Mac. See JOHN LOCKE,

Two TREATIsEs

OF GOvERNMENT

(Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1968). He would

quickly learn the meaning of "take it or leave it."
Closely related to adhesion, but distinct in meaning, is the concept of an "unconscionable"
contract. See Farnsworth, supra, at 302. A contract is unconscionable if it is so unfair as to
"shock the conscience of the court." For a more detailed discussion of unconscionability, see
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). In contrast to unconscionability, a claim of adhesion is based on the lack of a meaningful opportunity to negotiate over the
contract terms. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay In Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REV. 1174, 1176-77 (1983). While Mr. Locke might receive great value in his
purchase of a Big Mac, he would not ordinarily be able to negotiate a key term of sale: its price.
His choice, in reality, is to take it at the offered price or eat elsewhere.
288. For a comprehensive analysis of contracts of adhesion, see generally Rakoff, supra note
287, at 1177; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract,43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
289. For example, the common law of contracts has long held that infants and incompetents
are incapable of exercising the right to contract. Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 93 Eng. Rep. 954
(K.B. 1732). For a more detailed analysis of infants' and incompetents' lack of capacity to enter
into a valid contract, see generally ARTHUR LiNTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 146 (One
Volume Ed.) p. 213 (1952). Although the courts have utilized the contract maxim of lack of
capacity to void the attempted exercise of the freedom to contract by infants and minors, the
policy underlying the maxim is the states' desire to protect parties unable to protect themselves.
Similarly, public policy is invoked to void contracts that promote illegal behavior, such as
gambling and racial discrimination. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding
that the 14th Amendment forbids judicial enforcement of race-based restrictive covenants); Lokes
v. Kondrotas, 134 A. 246 (Conn. 1926) (holdingthat a note given for liquor was unenforceable);
Watts v. Malatesta, 186 N.E. 210 (N.Y. 1933) (refusing to enforce gambling contracts). It is also
well established that agreements based on fraud or duress will not be enforced as a matter of
public policy. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (holding that sufficiently extreme fraud will provide grounds "'for the revocation of any
contract'") (citations omitted).
290. Standardization of form contract terms naturally followed the growth of mass production
techniques for the sale of consumer goods and services.
291. See Goldman, supra note 287.
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discussed in the next section, a recent Supreme Court decision appears to have
calmed the turmoil, at least in the federal courts.
B. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute:
The Supreme Court Adopts Chicago School
Adhesion Analysis
A 1991 Supreme Court decision 29 confirmed that most of the current
Justices subscribe to the "Chicago School perspective. "2 93 The Shutes,
residents of the State of Washington, purchased passage on a cruise ship
owned by Carnival Cruise Lines, a Florida-based company. 24 The ticket
contained a choice-of-forum clause that designated the courts of Florida as the
sole location for resolution of all disputes. 2 9 Mrs. Shute boarded the ship
in Los Angeles and suffered injuries from a fall while in international waters.296 Mrs. Shute and her husband filed suit in federal court, asserting
admiralty jurisdiction. 29 The district court granted summary judgment to
Carnival Cruise Lines on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction.29 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that there were sufficient contacts to support
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 2' In rejecting Carnival Cruise's
argument that the forum-selection clause should be enforced, the court of
appeals observed that the clause "was not freely bargained for" and would
deprive the plaintiff of her day in court.3"
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in refusing to
enforce the forum-selection clause.3" 1 The Court readily acknowledged that
it would be unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger would or could
negotiate the terms of a forum-selection clause in a routine commercial cruise

292. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
293. This perspective might suggest that price is a function of composite demand, and that the
open marketplace will produce a viable alternative to the Big Mac if it is perceived by enough
consumers as being overpriced. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1
(3d ed. 1986); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient ConsumerForm Contract:Law andEconomics
Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583 (1990). From the Chicago perspective, a true contract
of adhesion cannot exist, or more accurately, should not be addressed by the legal system. The
marketplace and the rational consumer will jointly address the concerns of fairness raised by
adhesive sales policies, and will do so beyond any judicial or governmental policy making.
294. CarnivalCruiseLines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 587.
295. Id. at 587-88.
296. Id. at 588.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 377, 381-87 (9th Cir. 1990).
300. Id. at 389.
301. Carnival CruiseLines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595.
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ticket form."t Nevertheless, the Court found the clause to be a reasonable
exercise of the cruise line's interest in reducing operating expenses by limiting
the number of possible fora. 3t In implicitly adopting the position of the
Chicago School, the Court commented, "Finally, it stands to reason that
passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in
this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the
cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued." 4
Having determined that the plaintiffs were on notice of the choice-offorum provision," 5 the Court found that the contract survived judicial
scrutiny for "fundamental fairness" in that the plaintiffs "presumably retained
the option of rejecting the contract with impunity." 1 6
Carried to its logical conclusion, this argument means that no consumer
contract of adhesion will be found to be fundamentally unfair as long as the
consumer was on actual or constructive notice of the take-it-or-leave it
provisions.
In dissent, Justice Stevens recounted the historical hostility of the courts
to mandatory choice-of-forum clauses and other exculpatory clauses as "undermin[ing] the strong public interest in deterring negligent conduct."" While
noting that some commentators have questioned whether contracts of adhesion
can be enforced at all under traditional contract theory (for lack of voluntary
assent to the terms of the contract), Justice Stevens acknowledged the reality
that "standardized form contracts account for a significant portion of all
commercial agreements," and that a complete ban would be an extreme
position." 8 He concluded that the common-law approach to adhesion
contracts, which asks "'whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that
enforcement should be withheld,'" 3" was a valid iniddle ground. The dissent
thus indirectly accused the majority of abandoning the "fairness" test in its
310
entirety.
The broad holding in Carnival Cruise Lines, coupled with the Court's
failure to limit expressly this holding to the rather narrow facts of the case (a
tort arising in international waters under the law of admiralty), has powerful
implications. The case might be read to defeat all adhesion contract claims so

302. Id. at 593.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
305. It is unclear whether the notice requirement had been satisfied by actual notice or by mere
constructive notice from accepting the tickets without complaint.
306. CarnivalCruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 595.
307. Id. at 598 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
308. Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
310. Id. at 604-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/4

48

1996]

Oakley and Mayer: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND FEDERALISM

long as the restrictions are conspicuously displayed. In fact, one commentator
stated:
By refusing to treat consumer contracts differently from commercial
agreements and by narrowly defining the level of unfairness and inconvenience necessary to justify the nonenforcement of forum selection clauses,
the Court implicitly endorsed the economic model in which parties to a
311
contract are deemed to have knowingly and voluntarily allocated risk.
It is too early to determine whether the impact of Carnival Cruise Lines
will be that widespread. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that corporate
defendants in many diverse settings will cite Carnival CruiseLines in support
of printed-form clauses offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
C. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Claims of Adhesion
Most employers asking employees and applicants to sign a predispute
arbitration agreement will do so on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.312 Yet the
Gilmer Court, when asked to address the concerns of fairness arising from the
unequal bargaining power inherent in most employment relationships, concluded that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining power.., is not a sufficient reason
to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context." 31 3 In support of its reasoning, the Gilmer Court cited Rodriguez de
Qufas v. ShearsonlAmeican Express, Inc. 3"4 and ShearsonlAmerican
Express, Inc. v. McMahon." 5 In those cases, standard customer agreements
requiring arbitration of all disputes were found to be acceptable despite the fact
that these forms were used almost universally in the securities industry. 6
If such a claim of unequal bargaining power carries little weight for securities
customers, it is reasonable to expect the same result in the context of
employment.
The holding in Carnival Cruise Lines '7 is consistent with Rodriguez,
McMahon, and Gilmer. Although the current Supreme Court might be hesitant

311. Goldman, supra note 287, at 713.
312. See Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & Evelyn M. Hunt, AlternativeDisputeResolution:Arbitration
of Employment Claims, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 187, 191 (1989) ("Most employers that seek to
establish a mandatory arbitration procedure for their employees will offer the arbitration
agreement to the employees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis .... Rarely, if ever, will individual
employees be permitted to negotiate a change in the arbitration provisions that are offered.").
313. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
314. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
315. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
316. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 483-84; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30.
317. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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to proclaim its views of inequality in bargaining power so bluntly, it would
seem that mere inequality of bargaining power by itself would never be
sufficient to hold arbitration agreements unenforceable. Because unequal
bargaining power lies at the core of adhesion claims, it is tempting to conclude
that claims of adhesion are an endangered species, if not extinct.
Mitsubishi, however, left the door for adhesion claims slightly ajar by
briefly noting, "Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation
of any contract.' 3" Thus, the Court mixed claims of adhesion with claims
of coercion and fraud. Although coercion and fraud claims require active
malfeasance on the part of the employer, adhesion claims arise from the
economic inequality of the parties. But the Gilmer case gives the impression
that Gilmer's claim of inequality of bargaining power would be taken seriously
only if fraud or coercion, in the nature of overwhelming economic power,
could be proven.
Federal courts of appeals have had some occasion to consider claims of
adhesion, fraud, and coercion in connection with predispute arbitration agreements. Recently, the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have
denied claims of adhesion.1 9 Bayma, which arose in California, is of
318. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)
(citations omitted). The Court's dicta-that courts remain free to consider well-grounded claims
of coercion or overwhelming economic power-bears a striking resemblance to other empty
categories established in earlier dicta. For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974), the Court opined that an arbitrator's award might be overturned through judicial
appeal if enforcing the award would contravene public policy. Id. at 519 n.14. But "[a]lthough
the 'manifest disregard' of the law standard has been discussed in dozens of cases involving
judicial review of arbitration awards resulting from securities disputes, no cases have been
identified wherein vacation of a securities arbitration award has been clearly upheld on appeal."
Brad A. Galbraith, Vacaturof CommercialArbitrationAwards in FederalCourt: Contemplating
the Use and Utility of the "ManifestDisregard"of the Law Standard,27 IND. L. REv. 241, 252
(1993). Thus, variations of the dicta in Mitsubishi have yielded much discussion, but seem to
create an empty category-judges know what manifest disregard is not, but not what it is.
Similarly, in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court enforced a
forum-selection clause specifying the London Court of Justice for disputes between a United
States company and a German company. The clause had been part of a freely negotiated contract
between two sophisticated businesses and was enforced despite the apparent disadvantages this
would bring to the United States company. In leaving the door open for nonenforcement of such
agreements, the Court stated that such clauses should be enforced unless there is evidence of
"fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power." Id. at 12. The number of cases in
which "overweening bargaining power" has resulted in nonenforcement of a forum selection
clause apparently still stands at zero.
319. David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803 (8th Cir.
1986); Bayma v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 784 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1986); Pierson
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particular interest. In Bayina the court acknowledged that, under California
law, standard arbitration clauses in employment contracts are contracts of
adhesion and therefore are revocable at the pleasure of the employee. 310
Nevertheless, the court found that the FAA preempted this state law and
refused to stay the arbitration. 21
A similar federal-state conflict arose in Securities Industry Ass'n v.
Connolly, 3' which was decided after Volt. The Massachusetts legislature had
singled out mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts in the
brokerage industry as impermissible contracts of adhesion. 38 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state regulation was preempted because
32
"'the state law disturbs too much the congressionally declared scheme.',"
The court noted that the FAA did not render the state powerless and speculated
that Massachusetts could have passed legislation declaring all contracts of
adhesion to be presumptively unenforceable.'- Massachusetts could not,
however, single out contracts of arbitration for treatment different from that
given to other contracts.326
In Delaney v. Continental Airlines27 a California federal district court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the arbitration agreement in his employee
manual was unduly oppressive and contrary to his reasonable expectations. In
that case the internal appeals board consisted of three company officials.28
Arguably, a mandatory arbitration agreement that provides for appeals before
a board consisting of company officials is unduly oppressive, or at the very
least heavily biased in favor of the company. Nevertheless, the federal district
judge found "no showing" that the agreement was unduly oppressive and thus
upheld the arbitration agreement.329
Similarly, in Lang v. Burlington Northern Railroad,33 ° a federal district
court in Minnesota held that a mandatory arbitration agreement that was added
to the employees' handbook during the plaintiff's employment was not an
unconscionable contract of adhesion. Although the employee's only choices

v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1984).
320. Bayma, 784 F.2d at 1023 (citations omitted).
321. Id. at 1025. Chronologically,Bayma follows Southlandand precedes Volt (also California
cases). Its precedential value is therefore admittedly marginal.
322. 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
323. Id. at 1116-17.
324. Id. at 1118 (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987)).
325. Id. at 1120-21.
326. Id. at 1121.
327. 8 Individual Empl. Rights Cas. (BNA) 1170, 1173 (1993).
328. Id. at 1172.
329. Id. at 1173.
330. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
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were to accept the agreement or quit his job, the court rejected the adhesion
argument because the agreement was found not to be "inherently unfair."'331
Thus, from California to Massachusetts, federal courts in recent years
have turned a deaf ear to arguments based on adhesion. Additionally, adhesion

as a specific common-law ground for the revocation of a contract has been

commingled with the different concept of unconscionability.3 3 2 The logic

seems to be that (1) predispute arbitration agreements are not per se unconscionable (because, among other things, the Supreme Court intimated as much
in Gilmer); (2) a claim of adhesion, by itself, is insufficient to avoid a contract
provision unless the provision is itself in some way unconscionable; therefore,
(3) no successful claims of adhesion can be made to arbitration, which in itself
is not unconscionable. This line of reasoning arises in numerous federal
333
cases.
D. A Title WI-Based "Knowing and Voluntary" Requirement?
Although one case does not signal a trend, at least one federal circuit
court of appeals has refused to uphold an arbitration agreement when the
employee had no opportunity to negotiate or even to read the forms before
signing and when arbitration was never mentioned. In PrudentialInsurance
Co. of America v. Lai334 the plaintiffs worked as sales representatives in the
securities industry. Before signing standard U-4 registration forms, 335 the
plaintiffs were told only that they were applying to take a test required by their
employer; they had no opportunity to read the forms and they were not given

331. Id. at 1106.
332. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
333. See, e.g., Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154
(5th Cir. 1992) ("Adhesion contracts are not automatically void. Instead, the party seeking to
avoid the contract generally must show that it is unconscionable.") (citing 6A ARTHUR LINTON
CORBIN, CONTRAcTs §1376, at 20-21 (1962) and 7-9 (Supp. 1991)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1046 (1993); see also Adams v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 700 (10th
Cir. 1989) (noting that "even if [the contracts here] were contracts of adhesion, we find no
authority that arbitration clauses are unconscionable"); Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc.,
841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that "state law adhesion contract principles may not
be invoked to bear arbitrability of disputes under the Arbitration Act"); Surman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59, 61 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[tihere is certainly
nothing inherently unfair about the arbitration clauses, and they are therefore valid and
enforceable").
334. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995).
335. The forms, standard in the securities industry, required the employee "'to arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy that ...is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions,
or bylaws of the organizations with which I register.'" Id. at 1301. The employees were required
to register with the NASD, whose manual required arbitration of all disputes "'arising in
connection with the business of its members.'" Id.
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the NASD manual that mentioned arbitration of claims arising out of the
employment relationship.336
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit that included Title VII claims and allegations
of rape, sexual abuse, and sexual harassment by the employer. The defendant
filed a separate action in federal district court asking that the plaintiffs be
compelled to arbitrate under section 4 of the FAA.337 This request was
denied, and the denial was upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.338
The court's refusal to compel arbitration was based on the absence of a
knowing and voluntary agreement to arbitrate employment disputes: "We
agree with appellants that Congress intended there to be at least a knowing
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be
deemed to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies and
procedural protections prescribed in Title VII and related state statutes."339
Because of the nature of the Court's discussion of overwhelming
bargaining power in Gilmer, it seems doubtful that other federal courts will
follow the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and require knowing and voluntary
consent to predispute arbitration agreements invoked in Title VII or other
employment discrimination disputes. Yet there is a hint in Mastrobuonothat
when the party asked to sign a standard form contract does not clearly
understand that important remedies are being waived, courts should favor the
interpretation offered by the party who had no real voice in creating the
contract language." Unlike Carnival Cruise Lines, in which efficiency was
favored over fairness, Mastrobuonoresurrects values of fairness by resorting
to common-law contract doctrines, even of it does not follow an adhesion or
unconscionability analysis. Furthermore, unlike Prudential,Mastrobuonodoes
not directly address the significance of the amended Title VII right to a jury
trial and punitive damages.

336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 1305.

339. Lai, 42 F.3d at 1304.
340. In Mastrobuono, Justice Stevens noted:
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were actually aware of New
York's bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or that they had any idea that by
signing a standard-form agreement to arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an
important substantive right. In the face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this
intent to petitioners.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995).
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E. Application of "Knowing and Voluntary":
A HarassmentHypothetical
A short hypothetical should suffice to pose the dilemma presented by
these cases and current judicial preemption doctrine to arbitration of
employment discrimination claims. Suppose Sebastian Industries employs
Johanna Bache, and that one of Sebastian's employee-supervisors, Carl
Phillips, engages in egregious sexual harassment. Additionally, suppose that
Sebastian's in-house counsel has read Mastrobuono and has inserted a new
provision in the company's standard form contract, which already contains an
arbitration clause that requires arbitration of any dispute arising out of the
employment relationship. The new provision states that New York law shall
govern the rights and remedies available to the parties unless preempted by
federal law. This provision forthrightly reads:
The undersigned employee understands that in agreeing to arbitrate, the
employee forgoes the right to bring a lawsuit in state or federal court to
hear the merits of any claim s/he may have against the company, and that
in arbitration, the arbitral panel may hear any and all claims that s/he may
have against the company, but in no case may the arbitrators award
punitive damages against the employee or the company.
Further suppose that when she is hired, Johanna tries to delete the
arbitration provisions. She is told, however, that the company finds arbitration
to be in the best interest of both employees and the company and that the
standard terms and provisions "apply to everybody in the company." She must
either sign or seek work elsewhere.
If Johanna raises section 1 to claim that employment contracts are outside
the scope of the FAA, she will most likely lose,34' although not because
Congress has clearly expressed its desire that employees arbitrate with
employers whether they want to or not. Nor can she rely on Prudential,
because the contract terms make it very clear that she has waived her right to
litigate before a jury. Moreover, if she does arbitrate, the arbitrators probably
cannot award punitive damages because the Court in Mastrobuono and Volt
viewed the essential purpose of the FAA as enforcing the parties' contractual
intent rather than imposing a national standard of arbitration rights and
remedies.
This hypothetical illustrates that the Supreme Court has created a body of
arbitration law that makes no meaningful distinctions between voluntary and
involuntary waivers of punitive damages and the right to a trial by jury, both
substantial rights granted by Title VII as amended in 1991. If fairness is

341. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
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valued as highly as efficiency, Congress should consider adding a requirement
that these agreements be "voluntary." As mentioned earlier, in commenting
on section 118 of the CRA-1991 both Senator Dole and Representative
Edwards stressed the voluntary nature of arbitration agreements in the context
of employment discrimination law.342
VI. A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Even after Gilmer and passage of section 118 of the CRA-1991, there is
considerable confusion about the FAA, its application to employment discrimination claims, and underlying issues of federalism. Recognizing that the scope
of section 1 has not been addressed directly by either Congress or the Supreme
Court, and that difficult interpretations of the preemptive effect of the FAA are
engendering differences in the circuit courts, we believe that Congress must
act to clarify these issues. Our proposals place a primary value on freedom of
contract for employers and employees considering arbitration of employment
disputes, while recognizing that employees should be guaranteed certain
procedural safeguards to ensure fundamental fairness.
A. Proposalsfor Amending the FAA
(1) Section 1 Amendment
Section 1 of the FAA should be amended to make clear that all "contracts
or other agreements relating to employment" are included under the federal
umbrella of enforceable arbitration agreements.
(2) Section 2 Amendment
Section 2 of the FAA should explicitly state that the common-law presumption against arbitration is reversed and address whether the provisions of
the FAA are intended to be procedural or substantive. While Justice Thomas's
interpretation of the original intent of the FAA is entitled to respect, there are
some perplexing problems in meshing diversity jurisdiction with the view that
the FAA is primarily procedural.343 Such problems would not be solved by

342. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
343. For example, in a diversity case, the appropriate state law governs, but federal procedural
law applies. The FAA, if seen as procedural, would compel arbitration in federal court but not
in state court. Yet if a case is originally filed in state court by a plaintiff alleging employment
discrimination, a defendant seeking enforcement of an arbitration agreement could simply remove
the case to federal court and invoke the FAA. If there were no diversity, defendants could compel
arbitration only if state arbitration laws so provided. In short, enforcement of arbitration
agreements would be uneven.
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a congressional
directive to do away with diversity jurisdiction of federal
344
courts.

Congress should declare in section 2 that the FAA is substantive law,
binding on state and federal courts. Furthermore, Congress should expressly
declare that any state law that limits the recognition or enforcement of arbitral
awards is preempted. Additionally, Congress should preempt state laws that
limit arbitral remedies or interfere with parties' freedom to choose particular
arbitral procedures and consider including a provision to ensure that predispute
agreements to arbitrate are voluntary and informed.
B. Proposalsfor Amending FederalEmployment
DiscriminationLaws
As Congress clarifies its preemptive intent for the FAA generally, it could
also unify the piecemeal efforts by states to ensure that arbitration agreements
are entered into knowingly and voluntarily. The strong public policy interests
that motivate employment discrimination laws in the first place collide directly
with the public policy interests that favor increased use of arbitration. Section
118 of the CRA-1991 suggests, but does not expressly state, a resolution to
this collision: predispute agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination
disputes should be entered into only if the employee knowingly and voluntarily
waives the federal statutory rights, remedies, and procedures that would
otherwise be available. Senator Dole's comments support this resolution, but
the text and legislative history of the CRA-1991 does not support the inference
that the rest of Congress had the same intent.
Public policy interests strongly suggest the need to preserve freedom of
choice for individuals pursuing statutory causes of action in disparate dispute
resolution fora. Accordingly, in the context of employment discrimination
laws, Congress should expand the language of section 118 expressly to
approve predispute agreements to arbitrate workplace discrimination claims,
as long as (1) the waiver of statutory rights, remedies, and procedures is
knowing and voluntary; and (2) certain minimal standards are met to ensure
fair and impartial arbitral procedures. The following procedural protections
should be mandated when binding predispute arbitration agreements are
invoked in federal statutory employment discrimination cases.

344. For example, a plaintiff with a sex discrimination complaint could have both a state and
federal cause of action, file in state court, and have the case removed by the defendant to federal
court. Once in federal court, the FAA as procedural law would usually entitle the defendant to
a stay and to compel the plaintiff to arbitrate.
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(1) PredisputeAgreements to Arbitrate
Should Be Informed and Voluntary
The law not only should be "'attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds "for the revocation of any
contract,"'" 345 but also should be attuned to well-supported claims that the
choice to arbitrate was neither informed nor voluntary.
Taking a cue from Lai,346 Congress should amend section 118 of the
CRA-1991 to require expressly that predispute arbitration agreements contain
a "knowing and voluntary" waiver of Title VII jury trial rights to be effective.
As Senator Dole declared in his support for section 118 of the CRA-1991,
Congress intended arbitration of employment disputes only "where the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods. ""'
The courts should have little difficulty determining whether the jury trial
waiver was "knowingly" entered into by the employee. Although compliance
with the voluntariness requirement is subject to debate, given the current
standard of voluntariness expressed in Carnival Cruise Lines,"8 federal
courts are likely to view most employment agreements as voluntary. But with
specific language on voluntariness in Title VII or the other employment
discrimination statutes, litigants would be more likely to take exception when
gross disparities in bargaining power lead to an agreement to settle disputes
by arbitration. Although such a change would likely increase litigation over
such issues in the short term, such an increase might be a reasonable price to
pay to place values of fairness alongside that of "efficiency." Moreover, a tilt
towards voluntariness may bode well in the long term for arbitration of
employment discrimination claims, with more satisfied participants and better
publicity for the arbitral process in settling such claims.
(2) Employees Should Have Equal Input
with Employers Regarding the
Selection of Arbitrators
It is unconscionable for the employer to have sole power to choose the
fact finders. Likewise, it is unconscionable for the employer to mandate that
the arbitrators be chosen from the management team of the employer. An
existing model for fairly selecting the fact finder is found in the 1993 revisions

345. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
346. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
347. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
348. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1981).
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to the Employment Dispute Resolution Rules of the AAA. The AAA Rules
provide that all arbitrators on the panel "shall have familiarity with the
employment field." 3 ' From this panel of experts, AAA submits to the
parties a list of prospective arbitrators. Each party has the same number of
peremptory strikes as well as the ability to designate arbitration preferences in
order. This input provides the basis for AAA's selection of impartial, expert
arbitrators. The AAA process is designed to produce a neutral arbitrator that
inspires confidence in both sides. Congress should require neutrality and
competence from the chosen arbitrator in a manner similar to that utilized by
AAA.
(3) Limited Discovery Rights Should Be Guaranteed
Despite the cursory attention given to the question of discovery rights in
Gilmer, most employment lawyers would agree that claimants need access to
basic personnel records in the exclusive custody of the employer in order to
establish a prima facia claim. These records would include the claimant's own
personnel file, documents related to the position in issue, and personnel files
of persons who currently occupy the contested position. A list of routine
documents that are ordinarily discoverable should be set out with specificity
in the forum's operating rules. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has specified such a listing in its operating rules for securities customers'
disputes.35 ° Depending on the type of claim, other documents would become
relevant and subject to discovery after review by the arbitrator. Witness lists
should be exchanged prior to the hearing, and a limited number of depositions
permitted. One deposition per party should be available as a matter of course,
with other depositions permitted upon a showing of good cause. Even this
minimum discovery would probably require the availability of a prehearing
conference at the request of either party to resolve open discovery issues,
narrow the scope of the hearing, and sanction discovery abuses.
(4) Attorneys Fees Should Be Available
to Claimants Who Prevail
Currently, employment discrimination claimants who substantially prevail
in litigation are entitled to statutory attorneys fees. This provision should
remain inviolate in the arbitration forum in order to provide access to counsel
for low and mid-level employees. Otherwise, only highly paid management
employees would have the resources to pursue claims of discrimination.

349. EMPLOYMENT DisPuTE RESOLUTION RULES, Rule 8 (American Arbitration Assoc. 1993).
350. Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (1992).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss3/4

58

1996]

Oakley and Mayer: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AND FEDERALISM

(5)All Substantive Remedies Now Available
to Claimants Should Be Continued in the ArbitralForum
The availability of back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, injunction, reinstatement, and other statutory remedies should not be restricted in
arbitration. The purpose of binding arbitration is to provide a more rational
forum, not to reduce the statutory rights or remedies available to employees.
To permit otherwise would be unjust.
(6) The ArbitratorsShould Be Required to Publish
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw
Findings of facts and conclusions of law have the salutary effects of
(1) forcing a disciplined, reasoned decision from the arbitrator; (2) explaining
the reasoning and results to the participants (the least they deserve); and
(3) providing a basis for limited judicial review. If the arbitral forum is to
dispense workplace justice, the process should be able to withstand the light
of reasoned analysis. In deciding grievances, labor arbitrators currently
provide a form of findings and conclusions that should serve as a viable model
for this congressional mandate. There are pros and cons of making the arbitrators' decisions public, but the benefits of public disclosure outweigh the loss
of confidentiality. Disputes that are subject to arbitration frequently involve
important matters of civil rights that have been created by congressional
action. It follows that public disclosure of arbitration awards would deter
violations by employers and promote the goals of workplace equality.

(7) Limited JudicialReview Should Be Available
Employment laws are based on the principles of civil rights and fundamental fairness in the workplace. For participants to have confidence in the
process of binding arbitration, limited judicial review should be made available. In addition to the narrow grounds for review currently contained in
section 10 of the FAA, 351 employment arbitration awards should be reviewable by the federal judiciary, via magistrates, under the standard of "manifest
disregard of the law." Such a standard would require arbitrators to make
decisions on more than general principles of equity. Application of this
standard assumes that the arbitrator, or at least one member of the panel, is
familiar with the relevant statutory and case law. Federal magistrates are
generally familiar with employment law and would have the skills to render
efficient and reasoned review of the award based primarily upon the arbitrators
published findings and conclusions.

351. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988).
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Admittedly, mandating limited judicial review would entail some
additional delay before the decision becomes final. Although less efficient than
current arbitration practice, the requirement would provide judicial quality
control over the process.
VII. CONCLUSION

The adoption of the recommendations in Part VI would lead to a number
of positive outcomes. First, in both federal and state courts, where Title VII,
ADEA, or ADA claims may be invoked, the FAA would apply as both
substantive and procedural law. Any reluctance to continue Southland's3 52
finding of preemptive, substantive law in the FAA would finally be put to rest.
Second, any remaining doubts that the FAA applies to employment agreements
or contracts affecting interstate commerce would be erased. Third, in either
state or federal courts, and whether the cause of action is based on state or
federal employment discrimination law, the FAA would enforce only "knowing and voluntary" arbitration agreements. The various state common law
doctrines of adhesion, unconscionability, fraud, coercion, and the like could
be unified in a single inquiry as to whether the waiver of statutory rights and
remedies was knowing and voluntary. The various state statutes designed to
bring arbitration provisions to the attention of those signing such provisions
would not be expressly preempted when applied to employment discrimination
claims; such statutes would not frustrate the purposes and objectives of
Congress because Congress's purpose was to ensure a variety of freely chosen
dispute-resolution fora.
A fourth positive outcome potentially exists as well. When the parties'
agreement contains a choice of law clause, the "chosen" state laws would not,
in some Volt-like353 blind deference to federalism, be honored if it would
otherwise be preempted. This follows from the third benefit described above,
where applicants and employees may not be required to waive specific
remedies for proven instances of employment discrimination. Changing from
one forum (federal or state court) to an alternative dispute-resolution forum
(arbitration) should not lead to an unwitting loss of statutorily prescribed remedies, such as punitive damages.
Mastrobuono.. and its application to the issue of punitive damages are
instructive: if Volt had been followed to give primary effect to the New York
choice-of-law provision, no punitive damages could be awarded by the arbitrators because New York case law describes this limitation as an important point
of its public policy. But the majority in Mastrobuono avoided this result

352. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
353. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
354. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
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through a de novo contract interpretation, which is unlikely to yield consistent
results in future cases. The proposed amendments to the FAA and Title VII
would result in arbitrations that invariably allow arbitrators to award punitive
damages if appropriate. Mastrobuono arrives at the same result, but not
consistently; the anomalous reference to NASD or other procedures was seized
upon as an ambiguity to be resolved against the contract's authors. We would
argue that the reasoning process needs considerable simplification. Where
Congress declares that punitive damages may be awarded in a Title VII case,
congressional intent as expressed in the FAA and Title VII, considered
together, permits arbitral awards of punitive damages. In view of the remedial
character of Title VII, Congress should expressly make punitive damages a
nonwaivable element of the claim.
Given these proposed statutory changes, whether a claimant uses Title VII
as a cause of action or instead relies solely on state-law employment
discrimination protections, courts should recognize that Congress does not
intend the FAA to operate as substantive law preempting state common law on
adhesion or unconscionability. Courts should also recognize that states are free
under the FAA to suggest reasonable statutory requirements for the formation
of arbitration agreements, provided that those requirements are not hostile to
arbitration as such, do not purport to limit arbitration or arbitral remedies, and
address only the process of agreement formation with the aim of ensuring that
predispute arbitration agreements are knowing and voluntary. States cannot,
by statute or by case decision, limit arbitral remedies as a matter of public
policy; only the parties themselves may do so through reference to state law
that limits arbitral remedies.
In essence, the proposals offered here give overt recognition to the
preemptive power of the FAA as substantive law while preserving a more
meaningful role for the states. Under the status quo, the FAA preempts state
statutes designed to increase the likelihood that someone actually understands
that, by signing a standard form contract, they may be waiving the right to a
judicial hearing and, possibly, a jury. Moreover, under the status quo, choice
of law provisions referring to, for example, New York or California law may
limit arbitral remedies355 or stay arbitration pending resolution of judicial
actions, 3 6 and do so primarily as rules of reference in agreements by private
parties rather than as binding public policies. Under the proposals offered
here, states could pass legislation creating specific requirements for the
formation of predispute agreements to arbitrate, provided that those require-

355. This remains so even after Mastrobuono,because the perceived contractual intent of the
parties not to preclude punitive damages depends on the presence of references to NASD rules
or other rules that may or may not be read to allow arbitrators the right to award punitive
damages.
356. See Volt Info. Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 468.
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ments are not hostile to arbitration and are aimed at making such agreements
both informed and voluntary. State courts could interpret a revised section 2
of the FAA with similar aims, developing, along with the federal courts, a
body of case law focused on the formation process. State courts could also
adopt more nuanced adhesion decisions without the assumptions about
preemption that have characterized many decisions where predispute
arbitration agreements are challenged.357
A somewhat more cautious proposal would avoid any mention of "voluntary" or "knowing" in section 2, but would add such requirements to
predispute agreements to resolve Title VII or other federal employment
discrimination act claims."' There is reason to believe that Congress, in
mentioning ADR in section 118 of the CRA-1991, believed that it was
endorsing the voluntary and knowing submission of federally based claims to
nonjudicial fora. If Congress is content to allow unknowing or involuntary
waiver of the newly created rights to a jury trial and punitive damages in Tide
VII cases, it may do nothing and endorse the status quo. But change is
required if the newly created rights are worthy of protection and if states are
to have a more meaningful role in the process of governing agreements to
arbitrate. We believe that the proposals offered here represent a reasonable
balance between the original aims of the FAA, the federal policy encouraging
ADR as expressed in section 118 of the CRA-1991, and the need to clarify
and strengthen the role of the states in supporting a better informed and more
voluntary process of arbitrating employment discrimination claims.

357. In essence, the assumption widely made by courts is that adhesive agreements are not
necessarily unconscionable, that arbitration is not unconscionable, and that therefore, no
arbitration agreement could be unenforceable because of state law decisions on adhesion
contracts. See supra notes 312-33 and accompanying text.
358. In doing so, Congress could also make clear that states are permitted to impose similar
requirements for predispute agreements to arbitrate state-based employment discrimination claims.
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